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ABSTRACT
CONSIDERING HANS-GEORG GADAMER’S PHILOSOPHICAL HERMENEUTICS
AS A REFERENT FOR STUDENT UNDERSTANDING OF
NATURE-OF-SCIENCE CONCEPTS
by
Jared M. Rashford

The purpose of this study is to examine philosophical hermeneutics as a referent for
student understanding of Nature-of-Science (NOS) concepts. Rather than focus on a
prescriptive set of canons used in addressing NOS pedagogy in K-12 schools, this study
seeks to explicate a descriptive set of principles based on Hans Georg-Gadamer’s theory
of interpretation that has the potential for developing dispositions necessary for
understanding. Central among these are the concepts of fore-structure, prejudice,
temporal distance, and history of effect, all of which constitute part of the whole of the
hermeneutic circle as envisaged by Gadamer. As such, Gadamer’s hermeneutics is
contrasted with Cartesian epistemology and its primacy of method, the Enlightenment’s
prejudice against prejudice, the modernist/progressive tendency to consider all situations
as problems to be solved by relegating all forms of knowledge to techné, and the
subjective nature of interpretation inherent in a hermeneutics of suspicion. The
implication of such a conceptual analysis for NOS pedagogy is that student understanding
is considered not so much as a cognitive outcome dependent on a series of mental
functions but rather as an ontological characteristic of Dasein (being-human) that situates
learning in the interchange between interpreter and text. In addition, the philosophical

foundations implicit in addressing student understanding of NOS found in many
curricular reform efforts and pedagogical practices in science education are questioned.
Gadamer’s hermeneutics affords science education a viable philosophical framework
within which to consider student understanding of the development of scientific
knowledge and the scientific enterprise.
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CHAPTER ONE
PHILOSOPHICAL HERMENEUTICS AND
NATURE-OF-SCIENCE UNDERSTANDING

Introduction
Scholarship pertaining to the teaching and learning of nature-of-science (NOS)
concepts in K-12 schools gained momentum in the 1990s as a result of the heightened
significance imparted on both student and teacher understandings of scientific knowledge
and the scientific enterprise found in three seminal curriculum reform documents released
at the turn of the century.1 Numerous scholars have sought to examine how such
understandings relate to particular tenets posited to be representative of a consensus,
desired view of NOS whereas others have explored their relationship to effective
classroom practice.2 While these studies may suggest similar findings supported through
empirical observations, they generally fail to provide a philosophical analysis of the
concept of understanding itself and, in fact, may potentially foreclose student and teacher
understandings of NOS. I contend here that the discipline of hermeneutics affords NOS

1

American Association for the Advancement of Science, Project 2061: Science for All Americans
(Washington, DC: Oxford University Press, 1989); American Association for the Advancement of Science,
Benchmarks for Science Literacy: A Project 2061 Report (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1993);
and National Research Council, National Science Education Standards (Washington, DC: National
Academic Press, 1996).
2
The scholarship pertaining to student NOS understandings is discussed at length both later in this chapter
as well as in Chapter Three. For an example of research pertaining to a consensus view, see Norman
Lederman and Molly O’Malley, “Students’ Perceptions of Tentativeness in Science: Development, Use,
and Sources of Change,” Science Education 74 (1990): 225-239. For an example of research related to
effective classroom practice, see Nancy Brickhouse, “Teachers' Beliefs About the Nature of Science and
Their Relationship to Classroom Practice,” Journal of Teacher Education 41, no. 3 (1990): 53-62.

1

2
scholars and the greater education community an opportunity to enlarge the discourse
surrounding the concept of understanding; a form of reasoning that, at least in science
education, seems to have almost entirely managed to escape any form of conceptual
analysis despite its ubiquitous mention in both the literature and policy documents.
Shawn Gallagher, in his important work Hermeneutics and Education, initially
addresses the conceptual ambiguity surrounding the use of the term hermeneutics in a
variety of disciplines including theology, law, philosophy, literature, and the social
sciences.3 What he finds in common among the multifarious definitions included is their
respective identification of understanding or interpretation as the subject matter of
hermeneutics. In particular, this study emphasizes philosophical hermeneutics as
explicated by Hans-Georg Gadamer. While he did not write extensively on the subject of
education,4 Gadamer is credited with developing a hermeneutics not as an attempt to
prescribe a method or set of methods for understanding “…but to discover what is
common to all modes of understanding and to show that understanding is never a
subjective relation to a given ‘object’ but to the history of its effect; in other words,
understanding belongs to the being of that which is understood.”5 Gallagher interprets
Gadamer’s philosophy as a moderate hermeneutics situated between the more
conservative claims of Schleiermacher, Betti, and Hirsch, the more radical views of
Nietzche, Heidegger, and Derrida, and the more critical perspectives of Habermas, Marx,

3

Shaun Gallagher, Hermeneutics and Education (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1992),
3-4. This work will be cited as HE in the text for all subsequent references. Gallagher is explicit in his
attempt to “…arrive at a working conception, although not a final or adequate definition, of hermeneutics.”
4
See for example, Hans-Georg Gadamer, “Education is Self-Education,” Journal of Philosophy of
Education 35, no. 4 (2001): 529-538.
5
Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, trans. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald Marshall (New York, NY:
Continuum Press, 2006), xxxi. This work will be cited as TM in the text for all subsequent references.

3
and Freud, each of which is addressed more thoroughly later in this introductory chapter.6
A limited number of scholars have explored the implications of philosophical
hermeneutics for the field of general education and science teaching and learning
respectively.
The goal of this study is to determine the viability of using philosophical
hermeneutics to conceptualize student understanding of NOS. In particular, I attempt to
expound the philosophical assumptions inherent in favoring student understanding of a
consensus and/or desired view of NOS, as evidenced by the standards and empirical
research. Rather than rely on the effectiveness of a prescriptive set of canons used in
addressing NOS pedagogy in K-12 schools, this study then seeks to explicate a
descriptive set of principles based on Gadamer’s theory of interpretation that has the
potential for developing dispositions for understanding NOS considerations. A
description of such an analysis is contained in Chapter Two.
It is important to introduce briefly at this point the distinction between a
Gadamerian conception of understanding and one credited to Descartes7 as well as the
Enlightenment ideal perhaps furthered by modernist progressives.8 By favoring the
primacy of method over knowledge, education can arguably be reduced to a set of

6

For a brief comparison of these perspectives, see HE, 9-11. It is in particular a moderate hermeneutical
perspective that Gallagher uses to characterize Gadamer’s thought that I will explicate in my consideration
of NOS understandings.
7
René Descartes, Discourse on the Method for Conducting One's Reason Well and for Seeking Truth in the
Sciences, trans. Donald A. Cress (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1998).
8
In chapter six of HE, Gallagher uses Gadamer’s hermeneutics to present a strong argument against the
modernist conception of education with its emphasis on techné and critical problem solving which he
credits to the dualistic epistemology (subject/object) initiated by Descartes. Another scholar, however, uses
the same Gadamerian notion of understanding to question the primacy Gallagher affords to his modest view
of education over other philosophies, namely the modernist one under attack. See, Deborah Kerdeman,
“Hermeneutics and Education: Understanding, Control and Agency,” Educational Theory 48, no. 2 (1998):
241-266.
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techniques which allow us to manage information which in turn can result in a direct
transmission of the same information that amounts to a potential form of indoctrination.9
In contrast, philosophical hermeneutics strives to retain “the term hermeneutics not in the
sense of a methodology but as a theory of the real experience that thinking is”10 and, as
such, favors a view of education that remains open to the possibilities of interchange and
subsequent interpretations that are constitutive in developing understanding.11 This study
explains the central concepts involved in Gadamer’s hermeneutics as well as integrate
these concepts in the discourse surrounding student understanding of NOS.
The remainder of this chapter contains an introduction to several themes that are
further elaborated in subsequent sections, beginning with an overview of curriculum
reform efforts and scholarly research centered on NOS instruction in K-12 schools.
Similarly, a brief account of the development of the hermeneutic discipline is included so
as to provide a context for comparing a variety of perspectives regarding understanding
and interpretation as they relate to education. Lastly, the significance of the study for the
field of science education is presented. I aim to further the work of other scholars in
demonstrating that a hermeneutic approach to understanding not only provides a

9

This particular view is evidenced in the writings of Padraig Hogan and Richard Smith, “The Activity of
Philosophy and the Practice of Education”, in The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Education, Nigel
Blake, Paul Smeyers, Richard Smith, Paul Standish, eds., (Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishing, 2003) as
well as David Jardine’s, “Reflection on Education, Hermeneutics, and Ambiguity: Hermeneutics as a
Restoring of Life to its Original Difficulty,” in William F. Pinar and William M. Reynolds, eds.
Understanding Curriculum as Phenomenological and Deconstructed Text (New York, NY: Teachers
College Press, 1992). This last reference offers a brief explanation of the relationship between
hermeneutics and qualitative research.
10
TM, xxxvi.
11
While philosophical hermeneutics concerns itself more with the nature of understanding, other scholars
have challenged Cartesian foundationalism for its epistemological merit. See for example, Giambattista
Vico, On the Study Methods of Our Time, trans. Elio Gianturco (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press,
1990).
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favorable framework for NOS pedagogy but for the broader context of educational
philosophy as well.
NOS Considerations in the Standards and Scholarly Research
Nearly a decade ago, DeBoer explicated the historical and contemporary
understandings of scientific literacy.12 His thorough analysis addressed the varied
implications inherent in the use of such an ambiguous construct for more than half of a
century in the discipline of science education.13 From considering science education as a
vehicle for democratic change and a legitimate intellectual pursuit to positing a strong
relationship between scientific progress, national security, and technological and societal
change, agencies such as National Education Agency (NEA), the National Society for the
Study of Education (NSSE), the President’s National Research Board (PNRB), the
National Science Teachers Association (NSTA), the National Science Foundation (NSF),
the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS), and the National
Academy of Science (NAS) have attempted to define both broadly and specifically the
concept of scientific literacy. Most recently, the latter two organizations, encouraged by
the standards-based reform movement, developed Science for All Americans,
Benchmarks for Science Literacy, and the National Science Education Standards,
respectively.14

12

George E. Deboer, “Scientific Literacy: Another Look at its Historical and Contemporary Meanings and
its Relationship to Science Education Reform,” Journal of Research in Science Teaching 37, no. 6 (2000):
582-601.
13
Rudiger Laugksch, “Scientific Literacy: A Conceptual Overview,” Science Education 84, no.1 (1999):
71-94. In this article, the author explains how the notion of scientific literacy has come to represent a
variety of perspectives depending on both its use and assessment by sociologists, public opinion
researchers, and science education scholars alike.
14
AAAS, National Research Council, op.cit.

6
While curriculum movements for the last forty years have consistently called for
inquiry learning that attempts to create classroom experiences that mimic scientific
research, two notable distinctions distinguish these late 20th century reform documents
from their NSF- endorsed predecessors. While the former relied primarily on the
direction and expertise of scientists themselves, stressing a rigorous curriculum and
targeting future scientists, efforts of the AAAS and the NAS focused instead on minimum
standards for all students, preparing an effective citizenry, and teaching for increased
appreciation for science and technology.15 Secondly, the documents of the last two
decades contain significant references to nature-of-science (NOS) considerations.
Collectively, these have been characterized as purporting traditional images of science
such as being open, accommodating, and antiauthoritarian. They maintain that “science
distinguishes itself from other ways of knowing …through the use of empirical standards,
logical arguments, and skepticism”16 thereby affording students the preeminent means of
developing rational thinking skills. Simultaneously, researchers have noted the impact of
the science studies community on NOS discourse as evidenced by the documents’
insistence on the subjective nature of scientists themselves (not scientific knowledge), the
absence of any clearly defined scientific method, and the empirical indeterminacy of
evidence.17

15

Steve Turner and Karen Sullenger, “Kuhn in the Classroom, Lakatos in the Lab: Science Educators
Confront the Nature-of-Science Debate,” Science, Technology, and Human Values 24, no.1 (1999): 5-30.
16
National Research Council, 201.
17
One of the more influential philosophical/historical accounts of science in this regard is Thomas Kuhn,
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1996). For further
reading on Kuhn and his response to criticisms of his seminal piece, see Thomas Kuhn, The Road Since
Structure (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 2000). While many science educators delineate
nature of science concepts in terms of their agreement with Kuhn’s characterization of normal and
revolutionary science, claiming that his work inaugurated the postmodern era for philosophy of science, a
few scholars question the overall impact of his text on the study of science. See, for example, D. Wade

7
The standards put forth by the AAAS in Benchmarks concerning NOS fall under
one of three, principle categories: the scientific world view, scientific inquiry, and the
scientific enterprise. The first of these suggests that the world is understandable and that
scientific knowledge, while durable, is subject to change and limited. Scientific inquiry is
explained as relying on evidence, involving both logic and imagination to explain and
predict, and avoiding biases. Lastly, the scientific enterprise is characterized as a social
activity organized into content disciplines, with generally accepted ethical principles, and
consisting of individuals who participate in public affairs as specialists and as citizens.
On the other hand, the standards published by the NAS include the construct of NOS in
its section on Principles and Definitions:
The relation of science to mathematics and to technology and an understanding of
the nature of science should also be part of their [students’] education… Scientific
literacy also includes understanding the nature of science, the scientific enterprise,
and the role of science in society and personal life. The Standards recognize that
many individuals have contributed to the traditions of science and that, in
historical perspective, science has been practiced in many different cultures.18
While its significance in the national education arena may have indeed only been
realized near the turn of the century, published discourse surrounding NOS closely
parallels that of scientific literacy in the education research community and has thus
existed for over a century. From a contemporary perspective, however, as early as the
1960s, scholars considered NOS understanding to be an integral component of the
broader construct of scientific literacy,19 perhaps receiving renewed impetus from Snow’s

Hands, “Reconsidering the Received View of the ‘Received View:’ Kant, Kuhn and the Demise of
Positivist Philosophy,” Social Epistemology 17, no.2 (2003): 169-173; and Steve Fuller, Thomas Kuhn: A
Philosophical History for Our Times (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 2000).
18
National Research Council, 220.
19
For a general overview of research in this area, see Laugksch, “Scientific Literacy,” and Morris Shamos,
The Myth of Scientific Literacy (Newark, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1995). Shamos’ perspective
actually represented one of the more critical arguments against the call for universal scientific literacy on

8
“two cultures” thesis positing the need to be knowledgeable in both science and the
humanities in order to be a contributing member of a changing society.20 Still others in
turn suggest that scientific literacy be considered as consisting of knowledge about
science as well as knowledge in science, the first of these involving the epistemology and
sociology of science, both of which are considered NOS perspectives.21 Additionally,
some consider scientific literacy to lie at the intersection of NOS, scientific inquiry, and
traditional subject matter knowledge, further indicating a considerable degree of
consensus among scholars in the science education community regarding the role of NOS
considerations in effective science teaching.22
Scholarship pertaining to the teaching and learning of NOS in K-12 schools
gained momentum in the 1990s as a result of the heightened significance imparted on
both student and teacher understandings of scientific knowledge and the scientific
enterprise in the aforementioned national documents. Leading researchers have explored
and continue to explore the nature of such understandings as well as their relationship to

the grounds that there exists no conclusive evidence to suggest that the level of literacy of Americans
presents a challenge to our ability to compete globally and make informed decisions. One of the earlier
recognized advocates of nature of science and the secondary curriculum was Joseph Schwab. See Joseph
Schwab, “Inquiry, the Science Teacher, and the Educator,” The School Review 68, no.2 (1960): 176-195;
Joseph Schwab, “What Do Scientists Do?” Behavioral Science 5 (1960): 1-27; and Joseph Schwab,
Science, Curriculum, and Liberal Education (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1978). For a
concise review of the influence of Schwab on science education see Gary Fenstermacher, “The Nature of
Science and Its Uses for Education: Remarks on the Philosophical Import of Schwab’s Work,” Curriculum
Inquiry 10, no. 2 (1980): 191-197.
20
Charles P. Snow, The Two Cultures and the Scientific Revolution (Cambridge: Blackwell Synergy Press,
1959).
21
Jim Ryder, “Identifying Science Understanding for Functional Scientific Literacy,” Studies in Science
Education 36, no.1 (2001): 1-44.
22
Renee Schwartz, Norman Lederman, and Barbara Crawford, “Developing Views of Nature of Science in
an Authentic Context: An Explicit Approach to Bridging the Gap Between Nature of Science and Scientific
Inquiry,” Science Education 88, no. 4 (2004): 611.
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effective classroom practice.23 Empirical evidence from such studies suggests a number
of similar findings which include the idea that both students and teachers generally hold
naïve views with regards to NOS and that pedagogy emphasizing inquiry learning
coupled with explicit instruction in history, philosophy, and sociology of science, and
reflective practice affords students and teachers the best opportunity for developing
desired NOS understandings.24 Consequently, these researchers claim that NOS should be
given equal status to that of subject matter when considering curriculum objectives and
teacher preparation.25
The rationale behind such a privileging of NOS closely mirrors that touted by
advocates of universal scientific literacy. For example, some note that “science educators
have come to believe that if students understand the source and limits of scientific
knowledge they will be better equipped to make informed decisions about personal and
societal problems that are scientifically-based.”26 Others propose five significant reasons
as grounds for elevating the position of NOS considerations in K-12 pedagogy: to
enhance learning of science content, to enhance understanding of science, to enhance
interest in science, to enhance decision making, and to enhance instructional delivery.
Historically, the resurgence of NOS discourse in the literature in some form for ninety or
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more years attests to its significance with regard to science education.27 I contend,
however, that the nature of such discourse is questionable insofar as it seemingly favors
an educational philosophy grounded on a set of epistemological assumptions that could
result in directly transmitting the same information to students and possibly foreclosing
their own understanding of science.28 A view of understanding predicated on a
continuous fusion of horizons between the familiarity of a knower, in this case the
student, and the strangeness of a text, nature-of-science considerations, can conceivably
extend the scholarship pertaining to NOS pedagogy in K-12 schools. The next section of
this introduction briefly explains the evolution of such a view as maintained by the
German philosopher, Hans-Georg Gadamer, in the 20th century.
The Development of Philosophical Hermeneutics
In an effort to compare a variety of perspectives regarding student understanding
in educational contexts, this analysis considers the evolution of the discipline of
hermeneutics itself, focusing primarily on a period of history beginning with the late 18th
century, that led to the development of philosophical hermeneutics as posited by
Gadamer. As with Chladenius and other pre-romantic hermeneuts, the practice of
hermeneutics delineated between interpretation and understanding, where the former
sought to rid a text of impediments to achieving the latter, in an effort to understand the
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true meaning of the text itself.29 The work of Schleiermacher, however, in developing an
art of understanding beyond a collection of observations, as in the case of inductivism in
the natural sciences, inaugurated a universal project of understanding detached from all
content and recognized by Gadamer as fundamentally different from his predecessors.30
Here the concept of misunderstanding replaced a lack of understanding, and
interpretation itself became a problem of understanding. For Schleiermacher, the
reproductive act involved in understanding a text moves beyond words and their
respective meanings to include the individuality of the author of that same text, with the
objective of understanding the author better than he understands himself.31 Gadamer
further suggests that perhaps for the first time the interpreter could claim superiority over
his object in that “neither the saving truth of Scripture nor the exemplariness of the
classics was to influence a procedure that was able to grasp every text as an expression of
life and ignore the truth of what was said.”32
In the middle of the 19th century, Dilthey expounded the romantic ideal of
hermeneutics into a historical method and sought to require the same justification for the
human sciences as was constitutive of pure reason as characterized by Kant.33 As such,
just as
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…the essence of the experimental method consists in rising above the subjective
fortuitousness of observation and with the help of method attaining knowledge of
natural laws, for Dilthey, the human sciences endeavor to rise methodologically
above the subjective fortuitousness of their own standpoint in history through
tradition accessible to them, and thus attain objective historical knowledge.34
Dilthey’s work was predicated on a view of understanding that, epistemologically
speaking, involves verification, falsification, and confirmation of Geisteswissenchaften,
which identifies meaning with the subjective intention of the author.35 While perhaps
suggestive of espousing an idealistic metaphysics which claims an a priori meaning of a
text, Dilthey attempted to situate the problem of understanding in hermeneutics rather
than psychology so as to retain the historical worldview and guard against the objection
of relativism. In fact, Gadamer contends that “he [Dilthey] knew that in the evolution of
historical self-reflection leading him from relativity to relativity, he was on the way
toward the absolute.”36 In Dilthey, as well as in the romantic hermeneutics of
Schleiermacher, the apparent vagueness of thought concerning a subjective knower and
an objective text is rooted in an unresolved Cartesianism that “expects the uncertainty
and unsureness of life to be overcome not so much by the stability of the experience that
life itself provides but by science.”37 Both favored the application of a strict, universal
method for the human sciences that strives to eliminate the subjective bias of experience
in an attempt to understand the meaning of a text. This completeness of understanding is
similar, although not entirely analogous, to the notion of objectivity in the natural
sciences.
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Both Schleiermacher and Dilthey espouse a form of methodological alienation of
the subject from his relation to the past in an effort to free himself from the prejudices
associated with his own historicity. Here, the situation of the knower can only have a
negative value that the interpreter must attempt to transcend.38 It was not until Heidegger,
following the phenomenological impetus begun by Husserl at the turn of the 20th century,
that hermeneutics developed its fundamentally ontological character in Dasein, which is
concerned with being. With the purpose of renewing the question of being in general
rather than producing a theory of the human sciences, Heidegger’s Being and Time
transcended the work of his predecessors in challenging Cartesian metaphysics and its
insistence on privileging the notion of objectivity by attempting to separate the subject
from the prejudices of his tradition and experiences.39
Understanding is not a resigned ideal of human experience adopted in the old age
of the spirit, as with Dilthey, nor is it, as with Husserl, a last methodological ideal
of philosophy in contrast to the naivete of unreflecting life; it is, on the contrary,
the original form of the realization of Dasein, which is being in the world.40
As such, Heidegger posited a mode of being for both the knower and the known as the
center of inquiry that interprets all understanding as self-understanding and a projection
of the knower himself upon his possibilities.
Rather than expounding on the nature of being and thinking, but nevertheless
furthering the value of the prejudice-structure introduced by Heidegger, Gadamer situates
his discourse in hermeneutics on the historical nature of tradition and understanding, now
freed from the impediments of scientific objectivity. As such, the ontological (as opposed
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to subjective) situations of the knower and the object constitute productive ground for all
understanding which resides not in a reconstruction of the past but rather in a mediation
between the past and the present, “… a comprehensive horizon in which the limited
horizons of text and interpreter are fused into a common view of the subject matter-the
meaning- with which both are concerned.”41 In order to further explicate this fusion of
horizons that is central to this present study, Chapter Two includes a brief introduction to
the salient elements of Gadamer’s hermeneutics, each of which has been referenced in
educational philosophy and has the potential for reconceptualizing student understanding
of NOS. What follows here is an introductory discussion of how these principles have
influenced the concept of understanding in both educational philosophy and science
education.
Philosophical Hermeneutics and Educational Scholarship
Philosophy of Education
A select number of scholars have explored the implications of philosophical
hermeneutics for the field of general education. One notable philosopher of education,
Padraig Hogan, identifies six themes that emerge from the writings of Gadamer that he
believes have the potential for transforming educational practice: the primacy of play, the
principle of effective-history, the predisposing of thought by language, the plurality of
tradition, the fusion of horizons, and the dialogue that we are. He suggests that
understanding as embodying these components is oftentimes stifled and discouraged in
educational settings influenced by rational, positivist Western philosophy. For example,
he interprets the fusion of horizons to be “not a melting together in which all tensions are
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laid to rest, but an attentive to-and-fro between the otherness of that which addresses the
learner.”42 Thus pedagogy is viewed not so much as a means of transmitting knowledge
and values but rather as “…an interplay with overt and unseen consequences.”43
Gallagher provides arguably the most comprehensive scholarship relating
Gadamer’s hermeneutics to educational philosophy. In his seminal piece, Hermeneutics
and Education, he identifies philosophical hermeneutics with a moderate view of
education, as distinct from espousing either a conservative, critical, modernist, or radical
view of understanding. He compares a Gadamerian view of understanding with that
espoused by more conservative hermeneuts with regards to the hermeneutic circle, the
notion of objectivity, and the act of reproduction involved in interpretation. Seeming to
take their lead from the ideals posited by Romantic hermeneuts such as Schleiermacher
and Dilthey, individuals with a more conservative view of understanding attempt to reach
full understanding through the completion of the hermeneutic circle.44 Whereas the whole
determines the parts but is itself determined by those same parts (as in the case of Biblical
exegesis), complete understanding can be achieved as a result of the continuous back and
forth between these two primary constituents of understanding, the whole and its parts.
Similarly, whereas the systematic application of a controlled set of methods cannot lead
to absolute truth, for the conservative hermeneut, objective understanding is possible
through the use of a prescriptive set of canons. As such, the primacy of procedure is
accepted as a means of reproducing the original meaning in the object under study.
42
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Gallagher notes, however, that for the conservative hermenuet, there may be a difference
between understanding and meaning making, the former concerning that nature of the
original meaning that exists in the text itself which is ascertainable through the methods
described above, the latter relating to the particular significance of the text for the
interpreter which is not amenable to such conservative views of understanding.45
In his consideration of the relationship between critical hermeneutics and
philosophical hermeneutics, Gallagher focuses his analysis on the act of reproduction and
the concepts of hegemony, habitus, and critical reflection. While the critical perspective
is evident in the writings of Marx, Freud and numerous other scholars, Gallagher uses
primarily the conversations that took place between Gagdamer and Jurgen Habermas to
compare/contrast these two perspectives. Habermas challenged Gadamer’s contention
concerning the universality of hermeneutics, using as an example the monological natureof-science as compared to the constitutive dialogical component inherent in a
hermeneutical understanding of understanding.46 But the primary difference between
critical and moderate hermeneutics, according to Gallagher, involves the insistence of the
former on striving for some form of emancipation through neutralizing the language of
the text that seeks to reinforce or reproduce the traditional power structures. Such a
liberation is possible only through critical reflection that attempts to acknowledge the
extrahermeneutical factors involved in understanding, which Habermas contends that
Gadamder fails to do.47 For the critical hermeneut, the absence of this type of reflection
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results in a form of hegemony and a reproduction of a given habitus.48 On the other hand,
when included in the practice of interpretation, critical reflection can lead to an
ideologically-neutral, objective understanding of a given text.
Lastly, Gallagher compares the views of more radical hermeneuts, such as
Foucault and Derrida, with those of Gadamer, this time emphasizing the concepts of
textuality, play, and radical suspicion. Unlike conservative and even critical perspectives
that believe that objective understanding is possible, the former through methodological
control and the latter through critical reflection, the radical view seems to eschew any
form of principles and/or canons that would attempt to reach objective meaning.
Focusing on the writings of Derrida,49 Gallagher represents the radical perspective as on
the one hand positing the non-existence of any form of justification for interpretation
while on the other hand not entirely favoring a completely arbitrary process of meaning
making. Herein lies the notion of textuality which limits the possible interpretations of a
text by confining the interpreter to the language of the text itself. For Derrida, however,
language is part of the play of the text, and as such holds no objective value. Unlike the
critical hermeneuts who focus on the entrahermeneutical factors involved in
understanding, such as power, authority, and tradition, the radical hermeneut does not
look either internally (to the interpreter) or externally (outside of the text). Gallagher
contends that the notion of play as described by Derrida results in a hermeneutics of
suspicion that rejects any belief in the possibility of objective meaning and/or truth in the
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interpretation and simultaneously challenges what he describes as a type of conversation
and dialogue predicated on a Kantian view of metaphysics.50
The above discussion addresses the major themes that emerge in Gallagher’s
comparison of Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics with those that are more
conservative, critical, and radical. How then does he consider the former’s position to be
moderate when compared to the others? According to Gallagher, Gadamer would
consider complete objective meaning (conservative and critical) and emancipation
(critical) to represent two unattainable extremes. He does not necessarily deny that
neither is in part possible but he does not make the distinction between understanding and
significance, as in the case of the conservatives, nor does he think it is possible to entirely
transcend the notion of false consciousness and hermeneutical bias, as in the case of the
critical scholars. Similarly, Gadamer does not favor exclusively the act of reproduction in
an effort to reconstruct original meaning (conservatives) or ideologically-neutral meaning
(critical), but rather suggests that meaning making is primarily a constructive and
secondarily a reconstructive act. Unlike the radical hermeneuts who emphasize the notion
of textuality that leads to a hermeneutics of suspicion and the conservative hermeneuts
who strive to eliminate the influence of the interpreter’s own situation with regards to
understanding a text, Gadamer favors the concept of a dialogue of trust between the
horizon of the interpreter and that of the object.
Aiming to use the educational experience over traditional textual analysis as a
model for Gadamer’s hermeneutics, Gallagher further explains learning in terms of the
interchange of a variety of non-coinciding interpretations, such as student-teacher,
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student-subject, and teacher-subject. As such, teachers espousing a hermeneutic
consciousness remain open to the possibilities of interchange and interpretations that
subsequently follow. Understanding is not considered as a narrowly defined,
epistemological cognition but rather an existentially comprehensive as well as
constrained and ongoing activity in which we already find ourselves engaged, a
characteristic distinguishing human existence, or Dasein. Rather than expound on the
prescriptive nature of educational constructs such as questioning, application, and selfunderstanding, Gallagher situates his considerations of education in hermeneutics in an
attempt to project their meaning into the traditional discourse of educational
philosophers.
While Gallagher supports the position of others who suggest an element of
familiarity between the writings of progressive educators and Gadamer in terms of ideas
such as questioning and fore-structures, he is careful to distinguish between their
respective considerations of notions such as productivity and application. Whereas
modernists and progressives seemingly overemphasize methodological procedures,
reduce all learning to problem solving (techné) and explain productivity in terms of
inventiveness and application in terms of utility, philosophical hermeneutics regards
understanding to be exemplified in the Greek’s notion of phronesis, which, he purports,
involves a self-knowledge not needed for techné and as such cannot be methodologically
instilled in students.51 For Gallagher then, Gadamer’s hermeneutics rejects the modernist
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tendency to reduce education to a set of techniques which simply allow us to manage
information. Instead he favors opportunities that place the student’s own possibilities at
stake and provide the necessary resistance to encourage the student to project himself
onto the tradition of which he is a part. As such, education becomes something that
achieves culture rather than something that is achieved by culture. 52
Similarly offering a compelling interpretation of the potential for incorporating
Gadamer’s hermeneutics into educational praxis, Kerdeman elaborates on and evaluates
Gallagher’s delineation between a Cartesian and hermeneutical (along the lines of
Heidegger and later Gadamer) view of understanding.53 Rather than subscribing to the
former’s insistence on a subject/object dualism that relegates all understanding to
epistemology, the latter considers understanding as an ontological way of being. She
recalls how for the hermeneut “meaning is not something that has to be produced
methodically; nor is understanding an outcome we deliberately set out to achieve…it is a
mode of ordinary practical experience.”54 She differentiates as well between what she
terms pre-reflective and clear understanding, the former pertaining solely to the familiar,
the latter attempting to negotiate with the strange. As opposed to traditional
hermeneutics, existential hermeneutics does not consider this strangeness as an objective
dilemma that we attempt to overcome but rather as part of human existence through
which we live. For Kerdeman, clear understanding is not to be mistaken for complete
understanding as sought by the earlier traditions in hermeneutics but rather is comprised
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of Gadamer’s fusion of horizons and its constitutive interchange between the strange and
the familiar.
The crux of Kerdeman’s position, however, involves ameliorating the supposed
tension touted by Gallagher and other proponents of existential hermeneutics between the
modernist view of education and one that recognizes the situatedness of the learner: “In
sum, while the epistemological subject is self-sufficient and detached, the hermeneutic
being is ensnared and engaged.”55 She believes that Gadamer’s approach to
understanding de-centers without altogether negating individual control by encouraging
the individual to remain open, thereby denying “neither our efficacy nor our finitude.”56
Furthermore, according to Kerdeman, Gadamer believed this life-orientation could be
addressed in education by enabling students to encounter differences and challenging
their assumptions, both of which can succeed only in the presence of teachers who
themselves possess this disposition of openness.57
Narrow Lines of Inquiry
Whereas the aforementioned scholars concerned themselves with how
philosophical hermeneutics relates to the broader context of philosophy of education,
others have narrowed their focus on their respective lines of academic inquiry. A brief
mention of their work here provides further evidence for considering the potential of
situating educational discourse in Gadamer’s hermeneutics. With particular attention
given to the practice of deconstructing a text, Crusius offers philosophical hermeneutics
as a viable alternative to Derrida’s hermeneutics of suspicion for teachers of English
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language.58 He begins his analysis with a thorough explication of various types of
hermeneutics and compares their respective developments with a similar evolution within
the philosophy of science. Crusius employs the Heideggerian notion of Dasein (human
being in the world) to acknowledge our own historicity in engaging with a particular text.
Since truth is dependent on Dasein and Dasein depends on being with others, he situates
the earlier writing of Plato and Hegel with regards to dialogue as inquiry and a dialectical
understanding of the truth, respectively, into Gadamer’s hermeneutics. He contends that
such an approach to textual deconstruction enables the listener/reader to construct
meaning anew, together with the other, through a dialogue that moves in both directions,
particularly when the interpreter is in tension-filled proximity with the text.
This dialogical nature of understanding involved in hermeneutics, coupled with a
Deweyan conception of democracy, is attended to by Garrison in his attempt to suggest a
hermeneutical approach for democratic listening.59 The author notes that due to the
ontological nature of openness as espoused by Gadamer, “… to listen well, we must
actively strive to understand the meanings of others in their terms.”60 Simultaneously, the
impartial listener ceases to exist as do prejudices against prejudices since “the point is not
to free ourselves of all prejudice, but to examine our historically inherited and
unreflectively held prejudices, and alter those that disable our efforts to understand
others, and ourselves.”61 Garrison dismisses the idea of sympathetic listening as a viable
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option along hermeneutic lines in that it relies on objectivity, the setting aside of foreknowledge, and attempts to only reproduce the meaning of the other. His emphasis on
such an approach to listening seeks to foster a critical form of education that challenges
“the assumption that truth and goodness will prevail so long as everyone can speak their
mind.”62 Whereas the preceding two references serve as exemplars describing the use of
Gadamer’s hermeneutics in specific contexts involved in educational practice, the next
section situates such discourse in the field of science education, the area of focus of the
present study.
Science Education
There appears to be a limited body of research in the science education literature
pertaining to the use of Gadamer’s hermeneutics as a theoretical framework. Martin Eger
published a series of articles positing the use of hermeneutics as an appropriate
theoretical framework for science education.63 He incorporates the Gadamerian notions
of positive prejudice-structures and interpretations as being constructions rather than
reconstructions to address the meaning students make out of science as it is learned in
educational settings, as opposed to directly from nature itself. As such, he uses the work
of others relating to students preconceptions,64 which can be likened to Kerdeman’s prereflective understandings,65 to exemplify the potential for hermeneutics in addressing
how students interpret science through the fusion of horizons (that involving the ‘forehaving’ and that of the text itself). He ultimately questions, however, the dichotomy in
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understanding established by constituents of both the natural and human/social sciences
to prevent against relativism on the one hand and scientism on the other. Sociologists of
science suggest that the writings of the preeminent philosophers of science well into the
20th century privileged scientific knowledge while they themselves largely represent the
postmodern perspective that has arguably challenged the objectivity of a scientific
epistemology.66 Eger instead contends that the scientists’ reading of nature and the
students’ reading of science both involve an understanding of a text that is beyond the
horizon of the interpreter and as such can be considered as a hermeneutic aporia.67
Focusing less on the prejudice structures inherent in understanding, Sammel
applies the dialogical, intersubjective component of Gadamer’s hermeneutics to the study
of teacher meaning-making and critical environmental education.68 Considering that the
“goal of dialogue, for Gadamer, is to reach an understanding that centers less on asserting
one’s point of view and more on individual transformation,”69 she contends that high
school teacher understanding, and understanding in general, is not contingent upon
“correctly” identifying the other but rather develops at the center of the “dialogical
interplay.”70 She aligns her research method with the hermeneutic practice of decentering the author of the text, both the text of her research and that of environmental
education, in an effort to allow for the co-production of meaning, both with regards to her
analysis and the participants’ understanding of environmental education.
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Most recently, Borda examines the implications of philosophical hermeneutics for
developing particular dispositions in science students.71 To do so, she establishes the
notion of a hermeneutic consciousness from Gadamer’s way of being that “allows us to
become more aware of our human limitations and finitude.”72 Similarly, she subscribes to
the hermeneutic commitment to consider understanding not as a cognitive achievement
but rather as developing through “…a certain orientation to situations which challenge
our preconceptions.”73 From his address given at the University of Leipzig in 1947,
Borda ascertains Gadamer’s hermeneutic scientist to espouse absent-mindedness, doubt,
and humility, some of which have been characterized elsewhere74 but for hermeneutics
serve as understanding itself and not a method for understanding. She also augments
these three dispositions with that of strength which she believes epitomizes the
hermeneutic ideal of remaining rooted in the familiar and not losing site of one’s own
views while enabling one to remain open-minded in the presence of the strange.
The Study
Whereas the primary science education reform documents of the 1990s together
with the body of scholarly research emerging since that time continue to play an integral
role in shaping 21st century national and state standards, NOS considerations have
perhaps influenced only to a limited degree the decisions of individual classroom teachers
regarding student understanding of the scientific worldview, science inquiry, and the
scientific enterprise. At the same time, some education scholars have cautioned against
71
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overemphasizing the seemingly shortsighted contention that NOS understandings, and
scientific literacy more broadly, are integral to individual intellectual development,
national security, and a democratic way of life.75 Likewise others have suggested “that
whatever the nature of (research) science, that ‘nature’ offers no legitimate warrant for
the claim that the needs of students, or society, or the scientific enterprise itself, are best
served” by explicit NOS instruction in the classroom.76 While questioning the
justification for any comprehensive reform effort is necessary, such a discussion is
beyond the scope of the present concern. Instead, since NOS has received significant
attention as a national curriculum objective, it is worthwhile to consider the philosophical
assumptions inherent in currently held beliefs with regards to student understanding of
NOS concepts which, I ultimately intend to suggest, remain seemingly rooted in the
Cartesian tradition and subsequent Enlightenment ideal that equate understanding with
epistemological cognition.77 Such a view has the potential to reduce NOS pedagogy to
the direct transmission of information, possibly resulting in a form of indoctrination and
subsequently foreclosing rather than enlarging student understanding. A related question
then, which is the primary focus of this study, is whether Gadamer’s hermeneutics offers
science education scholars and practitioners with an ontological view of understanding
that can be used to reframe the discourse surrounding NOS teaching and learning in the
K-12 curriculum.
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A study of Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics has numerous implications for
NOS pedagogy as well as for the broader field of science education. First, such a study
questions the epistemological assumptions behind the teaching of either a consensus or
desired view of NOS, often purported in the science education literature. In fact, several
education scholars now contend that the “scientific endeavor is looking more like a
mosaic of disciplines with a host of ontological, epistemological, and methodological
commitments, than a unified and homogeneous entity.”78 Simultaneously, teaching
students to understand and/or accept a prescribed set of objectives that epitomize
scientific knowledge claims and the processes used to arrive at such statements can all
too easily become a form of indoctrination, enculturation, or adjudication.79 Stemming
from such opposition, various authors have encouraged scholars and practitioners to
sincerely reflect on the role of education and the responsibility of educators.80
In that vein, then, I endeavor to use Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics to inquire into
student understanding of NOS concepts. Whereas there is an abundance of literature
examining how such understandings relate to particular tenets posited to be representative
of a consensus or desired view of NOS, there is an absence of scholarship pertaining to
the concept of understanding itself. Chapter Two explains the approach used in the study,
further addressing the particular themes of philosophical hermeneutics that serve as the
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basis for the inquiry. Chapter Three contains a description of both the rationale
supporting the inclusion of NOS considerations in national reform efforts as well as a
more detailed account of the body of empirical research that has resulted from such an
inclusion. In Chapter Four, I explicate the various philosophical assumptions inherent in
the use of the concept of understanding in the literature and policy documents, while in
Chapters Five and Six, I incorporate the Gadamerian concepts of fore-structure,
prejudice, temporal distance, and history of effect together with the problem of
application, experience, and the priority of the question into the discourse pertaining to
student understanding of NOS. Chapter Seven offers a discussion of the positive value of
considering Gadamer’s hermeneutics as a referent for both student understanding of NOS
and the scholarly discourse surrounding that understanding.

CHAPTER TWO
INQUIRY

The present inquiry involves a philosophical analysis of the nature of student
understanding in science education. Such an analysis is comprised of a number of
interrelated activities, namely conceptual clarification and differentiation, an examination
of the assumptions held by science education researchers and educators concerning
nature-of-science (NOS) pedagogy, and an appeal to the tradition of hermeneutics to shed
light on the discourse surrounding student understanding in educational praxis.81 By
considering what student understanding entails and explicating the various possible
philosophical underpinnings implicit in interpreting understanding, I examine how this
particular construct is used in the context of NOS teaching and learning and consider the
implications of that usage for theory and practice, with the intention of remaining open to
a more phronetic rather than technical form of inquiry, as incorporated into Gadamer’s
hermeneutics and summarized as a philosophy that does not:
… meet the criteria of theory as epistemé or sophia. Its subject matter will not
permit the same degree of exactness that we should expect to find elsewhere - in
mathematics, for example. This subject matter contains so much variety and
fluctuation that a theoretical account of it can be given only “roughly and in
outline” and can do no more than hint at what is true “for the most part.”82
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While I aim to provide a thorough inquiry into the possibility of including philosophical
hermeneutics into NOS considerations, I recognize the seemingly inherent limitations to
such a study and anticipate to leave “…the reader with more questions to be asked, and
with doubts and unclarities that remain.”83
Introduction to the Aporia
The purpose of this study is to suggest the use of a hermeneutical view of
understanding, as proposed by Gadamer, as a referent for student understanding of
nature-of-science (NOS). My central argument is reinforced by a number of primary
premises. Firstly, I contend that current views on the teaching and learning of NOS are
predicated on a particular notion of understanding, whose inherent assumptions have yet
to be analyzed for their philosophical import. Secondly, scholarship by philosophers
proper as well as philosophers of education in the field of hermeneutics suggests that
certain pedagogical practices may limit rather than allow for the development of student
understanding. Lastly, I suggest that a Gadamerian view of understanding, unlike the
dominant Cartesian, technical view arguably implicit in the majority of the NOS
literature and reform efforts, has the potential for enlarging student understanding of
NOS.84 While a consideration of the use of philosophical hermeneutics has been
discussed by only a limited number of philosophers of education, its inclusion in the
science education literature is even sparser. Here I hope to make an original contribution
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to the field of science education by incorporating an ontological view of understanding
into the discourse surrounding NOS pedagogy as well as to participate in the broader
discussion pertaining to the educational implications inherent in a hermeneutical view of
teaching and learning.
In an attempt to perpetuate late 20th century, curriculum reform efforts that
favored minimum standards for all students, sought to prepare an effective citizenry, and
aimed at teaching for increased appreciation for science and technology, the American
Association for the Advancement of Science published its seminal Benchmarks for
Science Literacy positing:
When people know how scientists go about their work and reach scientific
conclusions, and what the limitations of such conclusions are, they are more likely
to react thoughtfully to scientific claims and less likely to reject them out of hand
or accept them uncritically. The images that many people have of science and
how it works are often distorted. Hence the study of science as a way of knowing
needs to be made explicit in the curriculum.85
As a result of the ensuing imperative to teach a science for all Americans, renewed
emphasis was afforded to nature-of-science considerations in the development of both
school curriculum and lines of inquiry in the field of science education.86 Concerning the
latter, researchers primarily focused their investigations on either establishing a set of
tenets representing a consensus view of NOS or assessing the effectiveness of particular
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pedagogical efforts to improve student and teacher understandings of NOS.87 Although
several scholars seemingly recognized conceptions of NOS as being tentative and
historical and subsequently cautioned against considering any one set as better than any
other, their work in examining the particular approaches used to teach NOS continued to
be predicated on the notion of a desired, valid, mature, or adequate understanding of NOS
considerations.88
While the scholarship garnered from the efforts of such investigations may indeed
be valuable in terms of its relationship to the aforementioned objectives espoused by
adherents of science for all Americans, I contend that it presumes a particular
understanding of understanding that may limit rather than allow for its development. To
date, there is an absence of any serious philosophical analysis pertaining to the idea of
understanding in the science education literature.89 Several philosophers of education,
however, have expounded on both the ontological and epistemological underpinnings of
such constructs when considered in light of educational praxis. Notable among these
contributions is Shawn Gallagher’s Hermeneutics and Education in which the author,
using Gadamer’s hermeneutics as a “theory which illuminates the conditions of
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possibility of understanding,”90 questions the limitations of certain narrative definitions
of understanding commonly subscribed to in the field of education. Here, I wish to
similarly argue that the predominant view afforded to understanding in the NOS literature
has roots in the Aristotelian notion of techné rather than phronesis, Descartes’
foundationalism, and the resulting primacy of method purported by philosophers well
into the 20th century.
In his Nicomachean Ethics,91 Aristotle posits an account of knowledge consisting
of various disparate although possibly interrelated types of knowing. Among these, two
forms of reasoning differ in their respective modes of activity, that of production and that
of conduct:
Aristotle there aligns techné with a kind of activity which he calls “making” or
“production” (poieses). This activity issues in a durable outcome, a product or
state of affairs which can be precisely specified by the maker before he engages in
his activity and which, as surviving the latter, provides it with its end or purpose
(telos). Techné then is a kind of knowledge possessed by an expert maker; it gives
him a clear conception of the why and wherefore, the how and with-what of the
making process and enables him, through the capacity to offer a rational account
of it, to provide over his activity with secure mastery…he recognized another type
of activity, praxis, which is conduct in a public space with others in which a
person, without ulterior purpose and with a view to no object detachable from
himself, acts in such a way as to realize excellences that he has come to appreciate
in his community as constitutive of a worthwhile way of life. As an activity that
both involved one with other people and at the same time, was a realization of
one's self, praxis engaged one more intimately, or afforded one less detachment,
than the poiesis over which one exercised an uncompromised sovereignty. 92
The latter form of reasoning he referred to as phronesis and, by it, formulated a means
“… of viewing the regulation of practice as something nontechnical but not, however,
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nonrational.”93 Delineating between the agent, in the case of phronesis, and the producer,
in the case of poieses, a further distinction has been drawn between the inability of the
former to “…stand outside his materials and allow the productive process to be shaped by
the impersonal form which he has objectively conceived” as “…he becomes and
discovers who he is through [his] actions.”94 As such, phronesis does not stand outside or
above oneself and is unable to be instrumentalized in the same way that techné can be
manipulated by a sovereign maker.95 Although scholars contend that Aristotle himself
recognized the supremacy of theoretical knowledge, or techné, over phronesis and
considered a life of contemplation as self-satisfying, he simultaneously acknowledged its
limitations with regard to sustaining life, thereby conferring upon phronesis a notable
distinction.96
In addition to developing his philosophical hermeneutics against a reducibly
technical form of knowledge, Gadamer questioned the primacy of method afforded to
hermeneutical inquiry, as influenced by Cartesian foundationalism. In his Discourse on
the Method, Descartes suggests that “…whether awake or asleep, we ought never to be
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persuaded of the truth of anything unless on the evidence of our own reason.”97 In his
endeavor to discover the foundations necessary for his rationalism, he resolved to
eradicate his previous opinions, which he believed depended more on custom and
example than knowledge, that he “…might afterwards be in a position to admit either
others more correct, or even perhaps the same when they had undergone the scrutiny of
reason.”98 Descartes’ four-step method, resulting in his cogito ergo sum, was predicated
on an explicit attempt to avoid all sources of prejudice in an effort to acquire clearer and
more distinct conceptions of the objects of his reason. Such a conceptualization of
knowledge, and arguably understanding, inaugurated a significant reliance on the proper
use of method and the subjugation of the ontological nature of both knowing and
understanding. For example, echoing the sentiment of Descartes, Bertrand Russell sought
“…to look into all [his] beliefs, and discard them if they seemed to have no foundation
except tradition or [his] own prejudices.” For Russell, the methods of science should be
privileged because of their ability to distinguish between true knowledge and mere
opinion:
It is science that makes the difference between the modern world and the world
before the 17th century. It is science that has destroyed the belief in witchcraft,
magic, and sorcery. It is science that has made the old creeds and the old
superstitions impossible for intelligent men to accept. It is science that has taught
us the way to substitute tentative truth for cocksure error. The scientific spirit, the
scientific method, the framework of the scientific world, must be absorbed by
anyone who wishes to have a philosophic outlook belonging to our time, not a
literary antiquarian philosophy fetched out of old books.99
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Although distinguishable from foundationalists by their respective metaphysical
assumptions, Gallagher suggests that champions of progressive education have likewise
perpetuated the Cartesian emphasis on method over a consideration of a descriptive
account of either knowledge or understanding.100 Insofar as such a view of understanding
as a form of cognition that is in turn only conceptualized in terms of epistemology
(method) presents an aporia in bringing to light the potential limits imposed by such a
perspective, I hope to enlarge the discourse on student understanding of NOS through a
consideration of Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics.
Approach to the Study
The substantive body of literature pertaining to NOS understandings generally
addresses how such understandings relate to particular tenets posited to be representative
of a consensus and/or desired view of NOS. Within this line of inquiry, philosophical
discourse has been considerably limited to topics concerning the ontological assumptions
inherent in the NOS tenets. The present study instead addresses the metaphysical and
epistemological underpinnings of the notion of understanding commonly used in the
discourse on NOS teaching and learning. Ultimately, I suggest the use of Gadamer’s
hermeneutics as a referent for considering student understandings of NOS concepts with
the aim of enlarging rather than foreclosing those same understandings.
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Whereas earlier hermeneuts delineated between three major types of subilitas,101
Gadamer considered understanding to involve interpretation and inherently imply
application. Thus, the notion of student understanding achieves a hermeneutical
significance insofar as NOS pedagogy involves multiple instances of interpretation such
as those between teacher and student, student and NOS content, and teacher and NOS
content.102 Because the study of interpretation and understanding (hermeneutics) is
inherently a philosophical endeavor, it is appropriate to engage in a philosophical
analysis of the meaning students make when considering the scientific worldview,
science inquiry, and the scientific enterprise.103 Such an analysis provides a cogent
argument for the need to reconceptualize the predominant view relating to student
understanding of NOS in terms of a Gadamerian view of understanding which includes,
but is not limited to, the notions of fore-structure, prejudice, temporal distance, and
history of effect. It is important to note again at this point that, although the intent of the
present study is described as such, the result of such an inquiry may yield an analysis not
entirely articulated at the study’s inception, as suggested by Dunne:
For it was with a firm footing in the world of practical affairs (that of teaching and
schools) that we first identified our problem and then went to the philosophers
seeking a quite specific type of enlightenment. What we discover, however, is that
philosophy will serve us only if we surrender to it. The original problem does not
remain in a position to dictate what the terms of the conversation will be but is
itself assumed into and transformed by it. It is as if one were to take up a game
with the object of becoming fit and then to find that one has succumbed to the
charm of the game itself so that one continues in a new and developing
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relationship to it – with one’s original purpose not unfulfilled but transmuted in a
way not anticipated.104
Insofar as this study consists of a conceptual analysis of understanding, the remainder of
this chapter contains a brief introduction to these salient elements of Gadamer’s
philosophy that are used in subsequent chapters to support a reconceptualization of the
narrative definition commonly afforded to understanding in educational practice.
Fore-structure, Prejudice, Temporal Distance, and History of Effect
According to Gadamer, Heidegger’s Being and Time provides the hermeneut with
a circle of understanding that is comprised of working out a series of fore-structures
(fore-having, fore-sight, and fore-conception) in an attempt to project a meaning for a
given text.105 Furthermore, understanding is possible only when these fore-structures are
not arbitrary but rather considered in light of the things themselves. Gadamer is explicit
in suggesting that what is constitutive to the art of understanding involves not a
subjugation of these particular fore-structures but rather a hermeneutic consciousness that
remains open to the meaning of the other:
Of course this does not mean that when we listen to someone or read a book we
must forget all our fore-meanings concerning the content and all our own ideas.
All that is asked is that we remain open to the meaning of the other person or text.
But this openness always includes our situating the other meaning in relation to
the whole of our own meanings or ourselves in relation to it…this kind of
sensitivity involves neither neutrality with respect to content nor the extinction of
one’s self, but the foregrounding and appropriation of one’s own fore-meanings
and prejudices. The important thing is to be aware of one’s own bias, so that the
text can present itself in all its otherness and assert its own truth against one’s
own fore-meanings.106

104

RG, 22.
TM, 267. See also Hans-Georg Gadamer, “On the Circle of Understanding,” in Connolly and Keutner,
eds., Hermeneutics vs. Science (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988), 68-78.
106
TM, 268-269.
105

39
Thus the concept of fore-structure serves as one point of departure between philosophical
and earlier hermeneutic reform which remained entangled in the fundamental prejudice
of the Enlightenment: the prejudice against prejudice itself, which denies tradition its
power.
Gadamer addresses the prejudice-structure emanating from the 18th century at
considerable length by referring back to the Kantian notion of understanding tradition
correctly, rationally and without prejudice, and the Enlightenment ideal of accepting no
authority and deciding everything before the judgment seat of reason.107 Considering the
primacy of an individual’s tradition even over his judgments, he posits, instead, the need
to restore the concept of legitimate prejudices, as distinct from those resulting from errors
in the use of one’s own reason, or overhastiness, and reject the mutually exclusive
Cartesian division between reason and authority.
If the prestige of authority displaces one’s own judgment then authority is in fact
a source of prejudices. But this does not preclude its being a source of truth, and
that is what the Enlightenment failed to see when it denigrated all authority. In
fact, the denigration of authority is not the only prejudice established by the
Enlightenment. It also distorted the very concept of authority. Based on the
Enlightenment conception of reason and freedom, the concept of authority could
be viewed as diametrically opposed to reason and freedom: to be in fact blind
obedience.108
Philosophical hermeneutics accepts the claims of authority as neither illogical nor
capricious and also accepts the subsequent idea that the mature person is one whose
insights and decisions are not freed from all tradition. As such, one of the primary tasks
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of hermeneutics is to explicate the separation of the productive fore-structures from those
that hinder understanding that takes place in the process of understanding itself.109
This second point of departure between Gadamer’s hermeneutics and that
purported by both the romantics (Schleiermacher) and the historical school (Dilthey) is
further evidenced by the distinction between their respective views on the circular
structure of understanding or the hermeneutic circle. For Schleiermacher and other 18th
century philosophers, actual understanding is achieved when the parts that are determined
by the whole themselves also determine the whole, as exemplified by the Biblical
exegetics who interpret Sacred Scripture by moving between the text in its entirety and
the individual books that constitute it. Consequently, “the circular movement of
understanding runs backwards and forwards along the text and ceases when the text is
perfectly understood,”110 and understanding has failed when this perfect harmony is not
attained. Beginning with Heidegger and later for Gadamer, the circle is more fully
realized rather than dissolved in perfect understanding and becomes recognized as an
interplay that occurs in the temporal distance between the interpreter and the tradition.
This interplay, in turn, allows for the development of understanding in that it is
predicated on the interchange between the familiar and the strange, a constitutive element
in the task of hermeneutics.
Hermeneutics must start from the position that a person seeking to understand
something has a bond to the subject matter, has come into language through the
traditionary text and has or acquires a connection with the tradition from which
the text speaks. Hermeneutic work is based on a polarity of familiarity and
strangeness; but this polarity is not to be regarded psychologically, as the range
that covers the mystery of individuality, but truly hermeneutically- i.e., in regard
to what has been said: the language in which the text addresses us, the story that it
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tells us. Here too there is a tension. It is in the play between the traditionary text’s
strangeness and familiarity to us, between being a historically intended,
distanciated object and belonging to a tradition. The true locus of hermeneutics is
this in-between.111
Furthermore, rejecting the idea that the meaning of a text resides in the contingencies of
the author and original audience, philosophical hermeneutics claims that understanding is
a productive act that does not amount to a better understanding, “either in the case of
superior knowledge of the subject because of clearer ideas or in the sense of fundamental
superiority of conscious over unconscious production.”112 To this end, the idea of
temporal distance assists in distinguishing between true and false prejudices as they are
stirred up and put to risk by being confronted with another text.
This tension between familiarity and strangeness is further described in terms of
Gadamer’s principle of history of effect, an element in the act of understanding
characterizing the nature of the horizons of both the knower and the known. Here the
notion of horizon replaces the more limited concept of situation so as to emphasize the
need to see beyond what is nearby in an effort to position oneself in the situation of the
other. Additionally, the hermeneutic situation depends on obtaining the necessary
“…horizon of inquiry for the questions evoked by the encounter with tradition.”113 In
explaining the history of effect as it relates to a fusion of horizons, Gadamer further
distinguishes his notion of understanding predicated on a dialogical interchange between
the past and the present:
Understanding tradition undoubtedly requires a historical horizon then. For what
do we mean by transposing ourselves? Certainly not just disregarding ourselves.
This is necessary of course insofar as we must imagine the other situation. But
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into this other situation we must bring, precisely, ourselves. Transposing
ourselves consists neither in the empathy of one individual for another nor in
subordinating another person to our own standards; rather it always involves
rising to a higher universality that overcomes not only our own particularity but
also that of the other. To acquire a horizon means that one learns to look beyond
what is close at hand- not in order to look away from it, but to see it better, within
a larger whole and in truer proportion. The horizon of the present cannot be
formed without the past. Rather understanding is always the fusion of these
horizons supposedly existing by themselves. The hermeneutic task consists in not
covering up this tension (between horizons) by attempting a naïve assimilation of
the two but in consciously bringing it out.114
Establishing the principles of historical effect, temporal distance, prejudice, and forestructures then is integral to the development of a hermeneutic consciousness insofar as
one seeks to make the meaning of what has been handed down through tradition
intelligible without having to reach an agreement with his own historicity. Additionally,
these same principles allow Gadamer to expound on a series of topics, namely the
priority of the question, the meaning of experience, and the idea of application, that have
been taken up by educational philosophers in the past and are similarly used in the
forthcoming chapters of this analysis to reconsider student understanding of NOS.
The Problem of Application, Experience, and the Priority of the Question
As mentioned previously, Gadamer dissolves the traditionally disparate subilitas
in positing a unified hermeneutics that is comprised of understanding, interpretation, and
application. Concerning the latter, he writes “...that application is neither a subsequent
nor merely an occasional part of understanding, but codetermines it as a whole from the
beginning.”115 The art of interpretation implies application in the fusion of horizons that
is constitutive of understanding. Such a notion, according to Gadamer, contrasts with the
demands of science which purports that understanding is achievable only when the
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interpreter refrains from participating in such an interchange.116 The crux of his argument
regarding application centers on Aristotelian ethics that connects “…reason with
knowledge, not detached from a being that is becoming, but determined by it and
determinative of it.”117 This form of knowledge instead pertains to the conduct of one’s
life and has been characterized as a form of “…activity which may leave no separately
identifiable outcome behind it and whose end, therefore, is realized in the very doing of
the activity itself.”118
Unlike both theoretical (epistemé) and technical (techné) knowledge, this moral
form of reasoning, phronesis, is not objective knowledge but is rather something that the
interpreter has to do. It is not a “…cognitive capacity that one has at one's disposal but is,
rather, very closely bound up with the kind of person that one is...phronesis falls on the
side of virtue rather than of knowledge.”119 Understanding hence, when considered in
terms of phronesis, becomes more of an event than a method which the interpreter
purposefully applies in objectifying a text, thereby precluding any distinction between the
subjectivity of the individual and the objectivity of the text. While Gadamer, following
Aristotle, relates techné and phronesis in that they both serve to determine and guide
action, he emphasizes a primary distinction drawn by the Greek philosopher between the
two by referring to the former as a knowledge of how to make for oneself and the latter as
self knowledge.
It is not only that moral knowledge has no merely particular end but pertains to
right living in general, whereas all technical knowledge is particular and serves
particular ends. Certainly if technical knowledge were available, it would always
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make it unnecessary to deliberate with oneself about the subject. Where there is a
techné, we must learn it and then we are able to find the right means. We see that
moral knowledge, however, always requires this kind of self deliberation.120
Gadamer is explicit in asserting that since moral knowledge is unknowable in advance
but rather realized in the situation of the person acting, his principles on phronesis are
incapable of being taught, although they “…really do correspond to the nature of the
thing.”121
Furthering the distinction between phronesis and techné, Gadamer next addresses
the concept of experience (Erfahrung) for the philosophical hermeneut. He contends that
self knowledge cannot be separated from experience as in the case of knowing how to do
for oneself. The latter form of reasoning is predicated on a teleological view of
experience that concerns itself with the knowledge to be gained through a confirmable
event.122 Gadamer expounds on this particular perspective through his analysis of a
Baconian method of induction which “…seeks to rise above the accidental and irregular
way that daily experience occurs and certainly above its dialectical use.”123 Such a
method, which stands in opposition to what Bacon considered as interpretation naturae,
or the interpretation that exists through the true being of nature, experimentally seeks to
thwart the mind from entertaining impetuous generalizations. Because of the ontological
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nature of our prejudice-structure and fore-understandings, philosophical hermeneutics
instead posits a dialectical view of experience, similar to although not synonymous with
Hegel’s Phenomenology of Mind, which precludes experiencing an object at random and
allows for enlarging what we thought we knew before. While a Hegelian notion of
experience ends in absolute knowledge, when all experience has been overcome,
Gadamer favors a dialectic of experience that “…has its proper fulfillment not in
definitive knowledge but in the openness to experience that is made possible by
experience itself.”124 In describing the dispositions characteristic of the experienced
person, Gadamer writes:
The consummation of his experience, the perfection that we call “being
experienced,” does not consist in the fact that someone already knows everything
and knows better than anyone else. Rather, the experienced person proves to be,
on the contrary, someone who, because of the many experiences he has had and
the knowledge he has drawn from them, is particularly well equipped to have new
experiences and to learn from them.125
Such a view of experience resonates with Dunne’s account of the value of experience as
constitutive of phronesis:
…experience signifies an achieved state that is the fruit of universalizing and
consolidating the meaning of many previous discrete impressions; this primary
significance is most perspicuously present in our own use of the phrase an
experienced person… phronesis is what enables experience to be self-correcting
and to avoid settling into mere routine.126
Insofar then as experience implies new experience, to be situated within a tradition, as in
the case of historically effected consciousness, it establishes rather than limits the
freedom of knowledge.
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Such a view of experience is made possible only by the asking of questions. For
Gadamer, the priority of the question is exemplified in the Platonic account of
knowledge, where in order to be able to ask questions, one must want to know and that
means knowing that one does not know. This openness to asking, like the aforementioned
openness to new experiences, is thus bounded by the respective horizons of the
interpreter and the universal and results in a type of dialectical negativity, a knowledge of
not knowing. Because it is considered more of a disposition than an action to be able to
determine what is questionable, Gadamer contends that the idea of method thus remains
limited for understanding.127 Similarly, he is careful to distinguish such a form of
knowledge from other variations of rhetoric which may attempt to use questioning as a
means of persuasion:
It requires that one does not try to argue the other person down but that one really
considers the weight of the other’s opinion. Hence it is an art of testing. A person
skilled in the art of questioning is a person who can prevent questions from being
suppressed by the dominant opinion. Dialectic consists not in trying to discover
the weakness of what is said, but in bringing out its real strength. It is not the art
of arguing (which can make a strong case out of a weak one), but the art of
thinking (which can strengthen objections by referring to the subject matter).128
The perspectives assumed in interpreting the notions of questioning, experiencing, and
application arguably contribute to defining understanding in education. I suggest in
Chapter Four that the philosophical underpinnings inherent in current NOS teaching and
learning, which seem to favor an epistemological as opposed to hermeneutical view of
understanding, may indeed limit rather than enlarge student understanding.
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Summary and Study Outline
The present study is educationally relevant in that it addresses the import of
incorporating philosophical hermeneutics into the discourse surrounding student
understanding of nature-of-science considerations. The next chapter contains a
description of both the rationale supporting the inclusion of NOS considerations in
national reform efforts as well as the body of empirical research that has resulted from
such an inclusion. In the chapters that follow, I use the Gadamerian elements as explained
here to analyze perspectives on student understanding as evidenced in the national reform
documents of the last two decades and the science education literature from the same
period, cognizant of my aim to avoid a uniquely technical analysis and willing to remain
open to the multiple experiences that such an endeavor can afford:
Philosophy is itself a practice, and, as in the case of any other practice, it is only
when one gets caught up in the doing it that one can learn to get out of it what it
has to give. What it has to give is indeed a kind of insight into the structure of our
other practical engagements and, moreover, far from it being the case that
experience in any of these (e.g., teaching) must be left behind when one takes it
up, such experience is itself a prerequisite for fruitful participation in it.129
In the final chapter, I discuss the positive value of considering Gadamer’s hermeneutics
as a referent for both student understanding of NOS and the scholarly discourse
surrounding that understanding.
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CHAPTER THREE
NATURE-OF-SCIENCE

A Rationale
Whereas a thorough analysis of the various rationales supporting the inclusion of
NOS considerations in the secondary science curriculum is largely beyond the scope of
this paper, a brief mention of the respective arguments of NOS advocates, both in the
science education and curriculum reform policy communities, provides a context for
situating the present discourse pertaining to student understanding of such
considerations.130 Nearly two decades ago, at the inception of what was to be a
recognizable period of science education reform, policy makers touted the ability of
science to “…help students to develop the understandings and habits of mind they need to
become compassionate human beings able to think for themselves and to face life head
on.”131 Ten years later, McComas, Almazroa, and Clough provided science education
researchers with a concise overview of the case for NOS, referencing a four-pronged
argument for NOS pedagogy that included utilitarian, democratic, cultural, and moral
components.132 According to the argument, students who understand NOS are better able
to make sense of science and technology, participate in socio-scientific decision-making,
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value science as central to the development of our culture, and understand the moral
commitments of scientists, commitments which can be instrumentalized by the larger
society.133 Another ten years later, similar sentiments were evident in the editor’s
introduction of an important text on scientific inquiry and NOS:
Such understandings are critical, especially when we quickly come to realize that
it is unreasonable to assume that our citizenry will make decisions about
scientifically and technologically-based issues by running to the garage to conduct
authentic scientific investigations. More realistically, experiences with inquiry
provide our students with foundational experiences from which they can reflect
on the nature and limits of scientific knowledge and claims. It is based upon this
knowledge that the general citizenry will derive meaning and research
conclusions concerning knowledge claims. This is the value of nature of
science.134
Resounding similarly with such democratic ideals as effective and responsible citizenship
and personal and social decision-making, the last reference additionally includes an
understanding of the limits of scientific knowledge claims as a favorable outcome of
NOS instruction. Proponents of such a view argue that “…individuals who understand
how science works will likely be less cynical about the scientific enterprise.”135 At the
same time, a number of researchers posit that acknowledging such limitations enables
learners to delineate between science and other epistemologies, thereby easing the
possible tension caused by discussions pertaining to scientific concepts that may conflict
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with certain metaphysical, theological, or other worldview assumptions.136 While these
same researchers may not explicitly purport a privileged status for scientific knowledge,
one final group of NOS advocates maintains that, as the only truly verifiable and selfcorrecting mode of inquiry, the domain of science should be recognized for its
remarkable effectiveness: “…unarguable and spectacular is the ace up science’s sleeve.
Whatever else we may think of it, we have to accept that science works. Penicillin cures
diseases, aircraft fly crops grow more intensely because of fertilizers, and so on.”137 Such
a view of science leads others in the science education community to the following
interpretation of the work of evolutionary biologist, Edward O. Wilson:
…evolutionary biologist Edward Wilson argues that only when all knowledge is
grounded on the firm foundation of the natural sciences will we have the best
chance of coping successfully with our existence. Taken to its logical conclusion,
this view of science can become the basis of a new conception of what it means to
'”know.” The many nuances and complexities become apparent as one studies the
history of science, but the essentially rational, progressive, universal nature of
science is the more accurate picture that science teachers should help students
understand. At the close of this century, Edward Wilson is saying that science will
show all disciplines, not just philosophy, the way toward more valid and reliable
knowledge. Science teachers should pay better attention to Wilson's ideas as they
search for ways to help students better understand the nature of science.138

136

See for example McComas, Almazroa, and Clough, “The Nature of Science,” Gould, “Nonoverlapping
Magisteria,” and Scott, Evolution vs. Creationism. The view that it is somehow possible to separate science
from other ways of knowing and that such a delineation facilitates the learning of scientific concepts has
been the focus of much debate in science education and philosophy of education. For a recent discussion of
the topic see, Michael Reiss, “Imagining the World: The Significance of Religious Worldviews for Science
Education,” Science & Education 6-7, no. 18 (2009): 783-796; Stuart Glenn, “Whose Science and Whose
Religion? Reflections on the Relations between Scientific and Religious Worldviews,” Science &
Education 6-7, no. 18 (2009): 797-812; and Francis Collins, The Language of God (New York, NY: Free
Press, 2006). The deliberate attempt to remove or ease potential sources of tension is a considerable focus
of the subsequent discussion in this dissertation.
137
Bryan Appleyard, Understanding the Present- Science and the Soul of Modern Man, (New York, NY:
Anchor Books Doubleday, 1992), 3. Scholars have of course questioned the validity of the empiricist’s
claim of what qualifies as knowledge. For a pertinent discussion on the primacy of science, as an empirical
epistemology, over other ways of knowing, see William Cobern, “The Nature of Science and the Role of
Knowledge and Belief,” Science & Education 9, no.3 (2000): 219-246.
138
Ron Good and James Shymansky, “Nature-of-Science Literacy in Benchmarks and Standards: PostModern/Relativist or Modern/Realist?” Science & Education 10 (2001): 183-184. The conclusion drawn by
these authors favors a progressive, stable, and rational way of knowing over other more relativistic

51

Whether by acknowledging the epistemological authority of science, seeking to
ameliorate the possible epistemic tensions encountered by learners and instilling in
students a greater appreciation for the discipline, or attempting to promote a greater sense
of responsibility and develop enhanced decision-making skills, advocates for the
inclusion of NOS in secondary science pedagogy have noticeably engaged science
educators and policy makers for the last two decades as evidenced by the considerable
amount of research in the area. The next section of this chapter provides an overview of
such research which subsequently serves as the focus of philosophical inquiry.
Research and Reform
Resulting from any combination of the various rationales supporting the inclusion
of NOS instruction in the school science classroom, reform efforts for the last twenty
years have focused largely on teaching a science that both promotes contemporary views
of NOS and seeks to develop those same views in secondary students.139 As such, the
National Science Education Standards state that “…students should develop an
understanding of what science is, what science is not, what science can and cannot do,
and how science contributes to culture.”140 Additionally, a consensus of researchers has

accounts. See Forrest, “Methodological Naturalism” for a similar opinion in favor of science as a privileged
way of knowing when compared to other worldviews that deny ontological naturalism.
139
While this dissertation considers research and reform documents primarily from the 1990s to the
present, many notable scholars in the field contend that NOS deliberations have been as integral to science
education as the more generally recognized scientific literacy movement and thus present in some form for
more than 100 years. See, for example, Chapter One of this dissertation, as well as Flick and Lederman,
Scientific Inquiry; McComas, Almazroa, and Clough, “The Nature of Science”; Norman G. Lederman,
Fouad Abd-El-Khalick, Randy L. Bell, and Renee S. Schwartz, “Views of Nature of Science Questionnaire:
Toward Valid and Meaningful Assessment of Learners’ Conceptions of Nature of Science,” Journal of
Research in Science Teaching 39, no. 6 (2002): 497-521; and Fouad Abd-El-Khalick, Randy L. Bell, and
Norman G. Lederman, “The Nature of Science and Instructional Practice: Making the Unnatural Natural,”
Science Education 82, no.4 (1998): 417-436.
140
National Research Council, National Science Education Standards, 21.

52
maintained that “…it is critical for us to do more than avoid debates about nature-ofscience by rising to a level of generality where disagreements do not exist. As educators,
it is absolutely critical that we carefully consider what aspects of nature-of-science are
accessible to school-aged students and what aspects make sense for all students to
know.”141 It is precisely this call for considering a set of NOS aspects that are both
appropriate and accessible for students that has dominated a substantial portion of the
research endeavor. What follows is a sampling of the numerous attempts found in the
literature either to posit a desirable set of such NOS aspects for science students or to
promote the use of NOS tenets to evaluate NOS understandings.
Beginning with the reform documents of the 1990s, The Benchmarks for
Scientific Literacy and National Science Education Standards address a number of
characteristics that pertain to NOS, examples of which include science as a way of
knowing, involving curiosity, creativity, and chance, dependent on persuasive
communication of ideas and findings, and built on a set of functional assumptions, some
of which involve the behavior of the universe and the understandability and predictability
of nature. 142 Extracting from some eight international science standards documents,
researchers have added that science is durable yet tentative, comprised of theory-laden
observations and both an evolutionary and revolutionary character, and affected by
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social, historical, and cultural traditions.143 Others have created models of nature-ofscience to include premises of both the nature of the scientific enterprise, such as the
social dimension of science and the major phases of the scientific endeavor, as well as the
nature of scientific knowledge, such as the developmental character of scientific
knowledge, to allow for appropriate curriculum development efforts and empirical
research.144
Science educators have further appropriated these tenets to derive criteria they
deem useful in assessing NOS understandings. In one such study of secondary science
teachers, the ideas of tentativeness, empirical basis, subjectivity, creativity, sociocultural
embeddedness, observation and inference, and laws and theories were used to compare
NOS conceptions before and after a science research internship treatment course.145 In
another study of school age students, nine themes, including scientific methods, diversity
of thinking, hypothesis and prediction, historical development of scientific knowledge,
and cooperation and collaboration in the development of scientific knowledge, were
considered in the development of a simplified account of NOS.146 Lastly, in a study
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involving science textbooks, researchers used a similar set of tenets to examine the
inclusion and representation of NOS aspects.147
In addition to efforts aimed at establishing generally acceptable and appropriate
NOS considerations for science education, researchers have focused their attention on
various pedagogical approaches which support the teaching of these considerations.
Recognizing the need to understand initial student understanding in order to successfully
teach about NOS, there is an ample body of literature pertaining to preconceptions, a
variable addressed in conceptual change learning theory.148 Based on the premise that
“…a conceptual change framework helps makes sense of the difficulties students often
have developing robust understandings of the NOS that can be applied in a variety of
settings,”149 one study, for example, sought to identify the “…strategies used by
secondary science teachers to diagnose their students' preconceptions in the regular
classroom environment and the ways that teachers might use the information gathered in
such a diagnosis.”150 Another study involving students in grades six, eight, and ten,
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contained research questions predicated on the idea that students’ existing conceptions
are very resistant to change and tend to impact the learning of new concepts.151
Several researchers have, however, questioned the assumptions underlying the
inherently rational account afforded to knowledge acquisition by such a theory. Notable
among these is a challenge to the conceptual change model in that it acknowledges
epistemological and metaphysical commitments among students as integral to the
development of new knowledge only to later “…marginalize [such commitments] in
favor of using anomalous data to induce conceptual shifts in students.”152 Additionally,
scholars examining the differences in learning between students of varying cultural
worldviews, suggest that those of non-Western origin have greater barriers to learning
science that are not strictly based on language.153 Rather than seek to promote cognitive
transformations as suggested by change theorists, these science educators suggest that:
The objective of initiating discussions upon the nature of science and culture
should not be towards discovering constructions that are then labeled as
“misconceptions.” The purpose of encouraging students to disclose their ideas
about science and traditional knowledge is to facilitate an increase in the
understanding of the differences in the epistemological premises.154
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While acrimony indeed surrounds the viability of a conceptual change theory of
learning for all science students, its adherents, who undoubtedly comprise the majority of
science education researchers, continue to believe that students interpret experiences
from a framework consisting of prior knowledge and additional experiences, thereby
positing that certain naïve views of NOS can be attributed partially to a lack of sufficient
experiences with the sciences. It follows then that a subsequent focus of NOS research
centers on both developing and evaluating those types of educational experiences
necessary to promote students’ understandings of NOS.
One of the more prominent discussions that have taken place in the literature
concerning how to effectively promote NOS understandings revolves around the
distinction between implicit and explicit attempts at instruction.155 The former generally
involve the inclusion of particular experiences in classroom instruction in an effort to
engage learners in scientific inquiry with the hope that, in doing so, they will develop
NOS conceptions aligned with current perspectives.156 Critics of such pedagogical
practices, however, caution against the likelihood of adequately advancing NOS
understandings without the direct involvement of the teacher and the deliberate design of
lessons to address particular NOS issues:
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If school science content instruction consisted solely of activities and laboratory
work without a teacher intentionally helping students make sense of those
experiences, certainly the students' content understanding would compare poorly
to that of another group of students whose teacher intentionally engaged them in
wrestling with the same science content using the same activities… Mistaken
notions of the NOS developed in this way, just like mistaken ideas regarding
natural phenomena, resist later implicit and even many explicit attempts to modify
those mistaken views. If a child's upbringing consisted entirely of accurate
implicit experiences regarding the NOS, they would likely develop a number of
accurate NOS ideas. 157
Instead they favor an explicit approach to teaching and learning as characterized by
planning through objectives, instructional attention, and assessments. Additionally,
“…this approach intentionally draws learners' attention to aspects of NOS through
discussion, guided reflection, and specific questioning in the context of activities,
investigations, and historical examples.”158 Rather than consider NOS conceptions as
dispositions towards science and attainable through effective inquiry experiences,
proponents of explicit instruction view these same conceptions as cognitive learning
outcomes.159 Of course, researchers contend that there are, in fact, a variety of
instructional methods that can be developed to incorporate aspects of both implicit and
explicit approaches. One such study, for example, examined the use of guided attention to
and reflection on NOS in the context of authentic scientific research, where the intention
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was not so much for the students to act as scientists but rather to become reflective about
science within the context of the scientific community.160
It is worthwhile to mention here that, while seemingly favored by advocates of
science education reform and leaders in the science education community, explicit
approaches to teaching for NOS understandings have elicited a number of challenges,
several of which serve as the basis for philosophical analysis in the chapters to follow.
Primary among these is a concern that a deliberate attempt to promote desired
understandings could amount to a form of direct teaching and transmission of
information. In response to such a critique, researchers have maintained a clear
distinction between explicit attention and didactic teaching, where the former simply
includes NOS among the various other learning outcomes that serve as the focus of
instruction, and have posited that explicit approaches to NOS provide students with an
opportunity to further engage with their learning:
It might be argued that an explicit approach entails imposing on students certain
views of the scientific enterprise. However our counter argument would be that
certain views of NOS have already been imposed on students. It is more likely
that those students were explicitly taught certain naive ideas about NOS. As such,
guiding students to internalize more informed views of NOS should not be viewed
as an episode of formal indoctrination. Rather it should be viewed as an attempt to
empower them to further pursue and make sense of the workings of a rich and
interesting intellectual endeavor, the scientific enterprise.161
Several authors are cognizant of and caution against the tendency of such a position to
assess student understanding based on its alignment with a prescribed set of views on the
subject and instead reiterate an instructional commitment to student understanding absent
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of adopting any one desirable view of science or the philosophical position of the
instructor.162
For these researchers, it logically follows that in order to evaluate the
effectiveness of any given pedagogical strategy in promoting the advancement of a
desired view of NOS, based on a consensus, pragmatic account of the nature of scientific
knowledge and the scientific enterprise, the development and use of appropriate methods
for assessing NOS understandings is a necessary complement to the existing body of
empirical studies. The vast majority of assessment instruments used prior to the late
1990s involved any combination of a set of quantitative item responses such as multiple
choice, agree/disagree, and Likert-type.163 While the inevitability of having to employ
such methods in some degree in large scale investigations is difficult to question,
objections were raised against the interpretations of scores from such tests based both on
the idea that they may lead to biased value judgments, if one assumes a particular
philosophical position and subsequently a correct view of science, and inaccurate
explanations of student views when compared to actual interviews.164 Discrepancies arise
when it is assumed that the understandings of both respondents and instrument
developers coincide with regard to particular statements. As a response to these
criticisms, a group of researchers collaborated on the development of the Views of Nature
of Science Questionnaire (VNOS). Such an instrument, it is argued, “…was developed
with an interpretive stance in mind, and aims to elucidate learners’ NOS views and
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generate profiles of the meanings they ascribe to various NOS aspects for the purpose of
informing the teaching and learning of NOS rather than for labeling learners’ views as
adequate or inadequate or sum their NOS understandings into numerical scores.”165 For
the last ten years, additional empirical studies have been designed with the intention of
eliciting student understandings of NOS concepts through the use of interviews in
combination with other various qualitative methods such as long term participant
observation and peer collaboration.166
The above discussion provides an overview of the more salient lines of research
pertaining to student understanding of the nature of scientific knowledge and the
scientific enterprise that serve as the focus for philosophical analysis in the chapters to
follow; namely, a consideration of viable NOS tenets for pre-college students, learners’
preconceptions concerning NOS, the effectiveness of respective implicit and explicit
approaches to teaching for the promotion of NOS considerations, and the use of varied
methods for assessing student understandings. Before progressing to that analysis,
however, brief mention is made here regarding the alleged results of a sampling of
empirical studies surrounding a number of the aforementioned areas of research.
Concerning the use of a previously identified, acceptable set of NOS tenets, one study
presented findings indicating that the pre-college student participants held fully formed
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NOS conceptions consistent with roughly one-half of the tenets.167 Another study
reported the inadequate alignment of multiple textbook sections with target NOS aspects,
highlighting the discrepancies that exist between national and international science
education reform documents and the representation and treatment of NOS in commercial
school science publication materials.168
One study, focusing on the methods used to encourage desirable NOS views in
the classroom, reported that although teachers admitted the importance of knowing prior
ideas that students bring with them to the classroom, such an appreciation was neither
well substantiated nor significant enough to encourage the actual use of diagnostic
strategies in instruction.169 Another study purported that, regardless of the methods used
to teach NOS, only a small number of students were found to have developed an
appropriate understanding of a particular view of scientific knowledge and the scientific
enterprise.170 Conversely, a different set of results suggested that, when given the
opportunity to assume a reflective stance outside of the role of an inquirer, teachers are
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effectively able to promote the development of NOS views in an inquiry context,171
further supporting findings that students are apt to attend to understandings of NOS that
match their inadequate views, absent the guidance from the classroom instructor.172 The
inclusion of such an explicit approach to inquiry teaching can be problematic, however,
in that in certain situations, the teacher remained ultimately in control of the discussion,
limiting student input to answering only those questions posed by the instructor rather
than engaging in a dialogic discussion.173 Insofar as these results may signify
“…significant progress toward understanding the whats, whens, and hows of nature of
science instruction,”174 scholars in the discipline have commented as recently as last 2008
“…that improving the teaching, learning, and assessing of NOS is still far from being
clearly understood and translated into practice.”175 The following chapter considers the
philosophical assumptions inherent in the teaching for NOS understandings as addressed
in the aforementioned research endeavors.
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CHAPTER FOUR
CURRENT ASSUMPTIONS

While prominent science education researchers interested in promoting student
understanding of nature-of-science seem quick to maintain and agree upon the
irrelevance of philosophical analysis pertaining largely to the metaphysical and
epistemological views of science intended for school science curricula, a review of the
literature as presented throughout the preceding chapters of this dissertation suggests an
even greater eschewing, or rather complete absence, of such an inquiry on the nature of
understanding itself. Whereas in the case of the former, their position is explicated in
terms of curricular, psychological, and pragmatic considerations,176 no explanations have
been offered concerning the latter, suggesting perhaps not a deliberate effort to thwart
such an attempt but rather a lack of recognition of the significance of striving for
clarification and clarity. Philosophers of education, however, insist upon the importance
of examining the assumptions underlying the use of such a widely used and poorly
conceptualized construct as understanding, not only, of course, within narrow lines of
inquiry but also in the broader context of education. In this chapter, I inquire into the
fundamental assumptions that seem to support the present use of the idea of teaching for
student understanding of NOS considerations, namely a Cartesian foundationalism and
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Aristotelian theoretical knowledge, or techné, with the hope of then proceeding to offer a
different conceptualization of the same idea along the lines of Gadamer’s philosophical
hermeneutics in the chapters to follow.
Cartesian Influences
As mentioned in Chapter Two, one of Descartes’ signature contributions to the
field of philosophy, and arguably a considerable number of disciplines as well, including
education, was his attempt to discover the foundations necessary for rational knowledge
by resolving to eradicate his previous opinions. The result of such an attempt was his
infamous four-step method which, he maintained, avoided all sources of prejudice in an
effort to acquire clearer and more distinct conceptions of the objects of his reason. When
viewed from a Cartesian sense of tradition, these sources of prejudice “…would have to
be something external, objective, and past,” capable of being stepped outside of as in
“…trying to step outside of our own skins.”177 As such, they acquire only a negative
value and are relegated into an association with either authority or overhastiness.178 The
result of this “…dominant ideal of knowledge and the alienated, self-sufficient
consciousness it involves” supports a hermeneutical perspective “…that regards
understanding as a repetition of a past intention – as a reproductive procedure rather than
a genuinely productive one that involves the interpreter’s own hermeneutical
situation.”179
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Insofar as the literature on student understandings of NOS involves a discussion
of preconceptions and their development, considers nature-of-science as a cognitive
outcome, and is derived in large part from a rationale consisting of both emancipatory
and ameliorating elements, I argue that such a discussion is predicated on a Cartesian
foundationalism as described above.180 Two of the primary reasons provided in support
of the inclusion of NOS considerations in reform documents and classroom teaching are
based on the assumption that a mature understanding of such considerations enables
learners to be more self-sufficient and responsible while simultaneously reducing any
possible tensions that may arise from metaphysical, theological, or other worldview
commitments at odds with a scientific epistemology. Such reasons resonate with
Descartes’ attempt to develop a subjective account of knowledge which, in eradicating all
sources of prejudice, sought to rely less on the past and tradition and do away with
obstacles that may interfere with its proper development. This development, in turn, as
characterized by Descartes as consisting of a series of procedures that begin with the
subjugation of tradition and end in a more reliable knowledge, is clearly evident in the
attempt of NOS researchers to examine student preconceptions so as to promote deeper,
more mature understandings. Whether seeking to analyze the more discrete
transformation of inadequate into adequate views or the progressive change in naïve
towards more intermediary or informed conceptions, the empirical studies mentioned
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here all support a developmental model that serves as the foundation for understanding
understanding.
Regardless of the view taken on such a developmental process by NOS
researchers, all of the currently employed models of understanding are seemingly rooted
in a conceptual change theory of cognition. As discussed in Chapter Three, such a theory
considers prior knowledge mostly in terms of the difficulty it presents in developing more
complete understandings. The attempt of many researchers to “…marginalize [such
commitments] in favor of using anomalous data to induce conceptual shifts in
students”181 and consider them as a form of belief rather than knowledge182 is
remarkably analogous to the Cartesian inclination to denigrate preconceptions as mere
opinion and unreliable. Similarly, as “…Descartes was most anxious to escape the
tradition of metaphysical disputations, which seemed to him to provide all of the
convoluted categories responsible for leading our thought astray,”183 a significant portion
of NOS research eschews any mention of including such commitments in the discourse
on student understanding.184 Instead, the focus is predominantly on successfully teaching
for an adequate understanding of NOS as determined by a set of predetermined,
appropriate tenets. As a result, the context for teaching and learning assumes a
reproductive character where the student is often left to arrive at an answer previously
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determined by the teacher and understanding is assessed based on the alignment of
student responses with NOS tenets, a duplication of a past intention.185
A Privileging of Techné
Like Aristotle himself who appears to have granted theoretical knowledge a
higher ascendancy over more practical ways of knowing, I contend that science education
researchers have predicated their use of promoting student understanding of NOS on his
reasoned account of techné over phronesis. Recalling from an introductory discussion in
Chapter Two, the former is characterized as an objective, teleologically-based, form of
understanding whose end, poiesis, contains “…a durable outcome, a product or state of
affairs which can be precisely specified by the maker before he engages in his activity
and which, as surviving the latter, provides it with its end or purpose.”186 The precise
specification mentioned here, in turn, “…enables [the expert maker], through the capacity
to offer a rational account of it, to provide over his activity with secure mastery.”187 As
such, the master of a techné is in a position to teach for “…every techné seems to be
teachable and what is known by techné is learnable,”188 a knowledge of which, once
learned, enables the learner to find the right means. Consequently, scholarship in the field
of philosophy of education suggests that the influence of such an account of knowledge is
apparent in the common practice of teaching and learning “…by isolating in precise
terms the goals of the activity, [and providing] the teacher with guidelines for controlling
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efficiency and straight-forward criteria for evaluating success.”189 A view of educational
practice derived from the principles of Aristotle’s techné is comprised of a careful
deliberation of desirable objectives, a thorough analysis of the appropriate means to be
used to achieve those objectives, and an intentional assessment of the product resulting
from the intended poiesis:
In profiling a teacher’s objectives, this model sought to separate ends and means,
to repose everything of value that a teacher might accomplish in the ends (i.e.
objectives) and then to construe all problems of teaching as ones simply of
finding the most suitable means to the achievement of these ends.190
When examined in light of such a philosophical perspective, it is not difficult to
conceptualize the influence of an Aristotelian form of techné on the research and reform
efforts centered on teaching for enhanced NOS understandings. To begin with, the
sentiments expressed by proponents of the inclusion of NOS considerations as curriculum
objectives regarding the enhancement of responsible citizenship among students is
arguably based on the notion of poiesis, where the responsible student is the product of
the teacher/expert-maker. The abundance of research related to the establishment of a set
of NOS tenets to serve as reasonable, useful objectives in the planning of classroom
lessons designed to explicitly teach for mature understandings similarly promotes a view
of education which conceives of knowledge as knowable in advance. Such an explicit
approach to pedagogy attempts to isolate the objectives of the particular lesson, and the
body of research pertaining to the effectiveness of such methods interprets the problems
of teaching for developed understandings mostly in terms of finding the most appropriate
means for achieving such ends. Additionally, the extensive discourse surrounding the
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development of appropriate instruments for assessing understandings as well as the
language used by researchers in identifying such understandings as naïve, elementary,
informed, mature, or otherwise, suggests a remarkably close parallel with the theoretical
account afforded to experience, one which can be separated from knowledge itself and
determined by knowing better.
Method, Cognition, Disengagement, and Teachability
Taken together, I maintain that Aristotle’s techné and Descartes’ cogito comprise
the philosophical foundations upon which much of the discourse on student
understanding of NOS is predicated; namely in the primacy of method, the reduction of
understanding to the domain of cognition, the appeal to a certain distancing between the
student and his knowing, and the teachability of an NOS curriculum. Knowledge, and
arguably understanding, is viewed from both of these perspectives as resulting from the
development and ensuing execution of a specific process, as exemplified by the work of
the craftsman in the former and the four-step method in the latter. NOS studies influenced
as such seek to continuously evaluate the effectiveness of pedagogical methods on
promoting desired understandings while simultaneously assuming those understandings
to be capable of their own methodical development as explained by various learning
theories. In reducing understanding to a form of cognition, researchers have promoted an
element of disengagement, such as in assuming a reflective stance following
instruction191 and negating previous conceptions in experiencing “… anomalous data to
induce conceptual shifts in students,”192 purported to be necessary for the development
of adequate views. This type of disengagement is analogous to being able to step outside
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of oneself, as exemplified in the Cartesian attempt to subjugate mere opinion in the
search for reliable knowledge and the maker’s ability to reside over and above his
product. Lastly, in large part due to their privileging of method as thus conceived, both of
these philosophical accounts suggest that, assuming a cognitive view, understanding is
capable of being learned and, consequentially, taught. It would be rather difficult to deny
the assertion that reform efforts and empirical endeavors asserting the importance of
teaching for enhanced NOS understandings among secondary science students espouses a
similar perspective regarding the teachability of NOS.
As presented, a strong argument exists in support of the influence of the collective
legacy of both foundationalism and theoretical knowledge, as explicated by Descartes
and Aristotle, respectively, on science educators’ research on nature-of-science. Whether
the assumptions that seemingly dominate the discourse on student understanding are
intentional or even recognized for that matter is a question unanswerable at present
considering the absence of any report whatsoever on their deliberation. Instead,
researchers continue to attempt to answer a plethora of questions ranging from the
appropriateness of certain NOS viewpoints to the degree to which teachers should
simplify viewpoints for various learners by turning to both epistemological and
psychological theories of cognitive development.193 In the next chapters, I consider the
aporia of student understanding of NOS from a philosophically hermeneutical
perspective. In first questioning the limitations of the predominant view afforded to
student understandings as presented in this chapter and then reconceptualizing the same
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using Gadamer’s hermeneutics, I aim to extend student understanding and the scholarly
discourse surrounding that understanding.

CHAPER FIVE
A GADAMERIAN RESPONSE

Introduction
As outlined in previous chapters, Gadamer offers a reconsideration of the concept
of understanding in his central text, Truth and Method, which differs not only from the
interpretation posited by Descartes four centuries earlier but also from the various
explications put forth by prominent hermeneuts from the Romantic period through his
own time.194 He argues that “…philosophical hermeneutics takes as its task the opening
up of the hermeneutical dimension in its full scope, showing its fundamental significance
for our entire understanding of the world and thus for all the various forms in which this
understanding manifests itself.”195 His voluminous writings on the subject purport to
offer “…no new canon of interpretation or new methodological proposals for reforming
current hermeneutical practice, but seek instead to describe what actually takes place in
every event of understanding”196 by “…throwing light on the fundamental conditions that
underlie the phenomenon of understanding in all its modes, scientific and nonscientific
alike, and that constitute understanding as an event over which the interpreting subject
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does not ultimately preside.”197 The present chapter focuses on a further explication of
philosophical hermeneutics, with particular attention to how such a view of
understanding contrasts with a Cartesian foundationalism and a technical view of
knowledge that, as explained in the preceding chapter, purportedly direct the predominant
conceptualization of student understanding in the NOS literature. The first section takes
up the themes of the hermeneutic circle and a “rehabilitation of authority and tradition,”
as described by Gadamer, while the second involves a discussion of questioning,
experience and application as explored by the philosopher in his “recovery of the
fundamental hermeneutic problem.”
The Hermeneutical Circle, the Problem of Prejudice, and the Nature of Horizon
Gadamer’s thesis on understanding is predicated largely on a hermeneutic circle,
as explored primarily by Heidegger, and differs significantly from those favored by
foundationalist and purely theoretical accounts of epistemology. As David Linge writes
in his introduction to Philosophical Hermeneutics:
Gadamer’s principal contribution to hermeneutics is to be found in his concerted
effort to shift the focus of discussion away from techniques and methods of
interpretation, all of which assume understanding to be a deliberate product of
self-conscious reflection, to the clarification of understanding as an event that in
its very nature is episodic and trans-subjective.198
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He acknowledges the influence of such ‘Enlightened’ views by maintaining that “…the
only thing that gives a judgment dignity is its having a basis, a methodological
justification (and not the fact that it may actually be correct). This conclusion follows
only in the spirit of rationalism. It is the reason for discrediting prejudices and the reason
scientific knowledge claims to exclude them completely.”199 Arguing further against the
use of any sort of four-step method or poiesis-derived protocol, Gadamer relates the
proper role of prejudice in the event of understanding to the subjugation of any prescribed
procedural description of the hermeneutic endeavor:
It follows that its [hermeneutics] work is not to develop a procedure for
understanding, but to clarify the conditions in which understanding takes place.
But these conditions do not amount to a procedure or method which the
interpreter himself must bring to bear on the text; rather, they must be given. The
prejudices and fore-meanings that occupy the interpreter’s consciousness are not
at his free disposal. He cannot separate in advance the productive prejudices that
enable understanding from the prejudices that hinder in and lead to
misunderstandings. Rather this separation must take place in the process of
understanding itself, and hence hermeneutics must ask how that happens.200
In questioning the idea that objectivity in knowledge is attainable only through the
application of a “neutralized, prejudice-free consciousness”, Gadamer suggests a view of
understanding not as a reconstruction of a past tradition but as a mediation, “…an event,
a movement of history itself in which neither interpreter nor text can be thought of as
autonomous parts.”201 Such an event is conceptualized not in terms of its methodical
precision and techné-like applicability, but rather as a game in which “…absorption into
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the game is an ecstatic self-forgetting that is experienced not as a loss of self-possession,
but as the free buoyancy of an elevation above oneself.”202
Gadamer offers the metaphor of the game to emphasize the positive value of the
inability of the interpreter to disengage arbitrarily not only from his prejudices but also
from the objects of his interpretation as well, a disengagement ardently sought after by
adherents to Descartes’ cogito. In addition, the metaphor is extended to challenge a
reducible form of knowledge predicated on techné by stressing instead a type of selfknowledge characteristic of a practical form of reason, or phronesis:
Understanding is not self-understanding in the sense of the self-evident certainty
idealism asserted it to have, nor is it exhausted in the revolutionary criticism of
idealism that thinks of the concept of self-understanding as something that
happens to the self, something through which it becomes an authentic self. Rather,
I believe that understanding involves a moment of loss of self that should be
investigated in terms of the structure of the game.203
When the hermeneutic circle, as envisaged first by Heidegger and later by Gadamer,
assumes the structure of a game, understanding is no longer perceived as a circular
movement, running backwards and forwards, and ceasing in perfect understanding, a
view espoused by the Romantics and members of the historical school.204 Instead the
circle is more fully realized, rather than dissolved, through the interplay of the movement
of both the interpreter and the tradition of the object of interpretation; an interplay that is
not subjective but issuing forth from the universality that binds the two.205 For Gadamer,
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this back and forth movement described is derived not from a set of rules over which the
interpreter is capable of presiding, as in the event of craft-making, but rather from that
which happens above our wanting and doing:
The back and forth movement that takes place within a given field of play does
not derive from the human game and from playing as a subjective attitude. Quite
the contrary, even for human subjectivity the real experience of the game consists
in the fact that something that obeys its own set of laws gains ascendancy in the
game. To the movement in a determinate direction corresponds a movement in the
opposite direction.206
Additionally, it should be noted that Gadamer made explicit mention of the uncertainty
involved in such a notion of play; one that includes a venturing into a foreign,
traditionary text on the part of the interpreter:
Rather the game itself is a risk for the player. One can play only with serious
possibilities. If, for the sake of enjoying his own freedom of decision, someone
avoids making pressing decisions or plays with possibilities that he is not
seriously envisaging and which therefore offer no risk that he will choose them
and thereby limit himself, we say he is only playing with life.207
An understanding predicated on the metaphor of play, then, maintains the constitutive
elements of Heidegger’s circle and, consequently, Gadamer’s hermeneutics; namely, the
uncontrollable projection of a series of fore-structures and prejudices onto the horizon of
a text in order to penetrate for meaning in an effort to “…see through the dogmatism of
asserting an opposition and separation between the ongoing, natural 'tradition' and the
reflective appropriation of it.”208
In order to play the game, then, Gadamer elaborates extensively on the
interdependent concepts of fore-structures, prejudices, and the nature of the horizon of
both the interpreter and the text, or interchange, in which he is caught up. He is explicit in
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his attempt to “… fundamentally rehabilitate the concept of prejudice and acknowledge
the fact that there are legitimate prejudices,”209 an idea denied by a Cartesian view of
rationalism which subsequently supported the fundamental prejudice of the
Enlightenment, the prejudice against prejudice itself, which denies tradition its authority.
According to Gadamer, the legacy of such a fundamental prejudice had profound
implications for numerous academic disciplines due to its inherent reproducibility:
At the same time, however, Gadamer’s insight does give us occasion to question
the abstract opposition between knowledge and tradition that has become a dogma
in hermeneutical theory and to appreciate the sense in which scientific historical
understanding is itself the bearer and continuer of tradition.210
Philosophical hermeneutics considers prejudices instead not as a “…prison that isolates
us from the new, but a particular starting point from which understanding advances.”211 It
is specifically these prejudices, “…constantly at stake right up to the moment of their
surrender - which surrender could also be called a transformation,”212 that condition all
understanding. Writing in response to challenges emanating from a Marxist critique of
ideology by Habermas, Gadamer acknowledges the influence of the fundamental
prejudice on the denigration of all authority and the ascendancy of a neutral, traditionfree ideology:
Authority is by his definition a dogmatic power. I cannot accept the assertion that
reason and authority are abstract antitheses, as the emancipatory Enlightenment
did. For in my opinion this abstract antithesis embraced by the Enlightenment is a
mistake fraught with ominous consequences. In it, reflection is granted a false
power, and the true dependencies involved are misjudged on the basis of a
fallacious idealism. It seems evident to me that acceptance or acknowledgement is
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the decisive thing for relationships to authority. The obedience that belongs to
true authority is neither blind nor slavish.213

He replaces the foundationalist prejudice against tradition and in favor of the subjugation
of arbitrary fore-structures with a view of understanding predicated on the concept of a
legitimate authority and the openness of all pre-understandings. In doing so, he furthers
the task of hermeneutics beyond that of his predecessors who, as explained briefly in
Chapter Two, arguably continued to consider understanding in terms of a possible
disengagement between the interpreter and the object of his interpretation, a
disengagement analogous to that espoused by adherents of both foundationalism and
techné: “Beneath their assertion of the finitude and historicity of man, both
Schleiermacher and Dilthey continue to pay homage to the Cartesian and Enlightenment
ideal of the autonomous subject who successfully extricates himself from the immediate
entanglements of history and the prejudices that come with that entanglement.”214
Gadamer explains his rejection of a disentangled interpreter in terms of his
concept of effective history and horizon, an extension rather than synonym of the idea of
a situation, which itself does not admit of objective understanding in that one cannot
stand outside of it [situation]:
We define the concept of situation by saying that it represents a standpoint that
limits the possibility of vision. Hence essential to the concept of situation is the
concept of horizon. A person who has no horizon does not see far enough and
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hence over-values what is nearest to him. On the other hand, to have a horizon
means not being limited to what is nearby but being able to see beyond it.215

This looking beyond one’s horizon involves not so much a turning away as it does a
seeing better, within a larger whole of the tradition and its past, by transposing oneself
onto a historical horizon. Gadamer contends, however, that “…transposing ourselves
consists neither in the empathy of one individual for another nor in subordinating another
person to our own standards; rather it always involves rising to a higher universality that
overcomes not only our own particularity but also that of the other.”216 As such, the
discovery of another horizon affords an understanding that does not inherently admit of
agreement on the part of the interpreter. A fusion of respective horizons, often considered
to exist by themselves and constituting the fundamental hermeneutic task, strives to bring
out the tension between them rather than eschew possible conflict by attempting a naïve
assimilation of the two. Instead, the polarity that exists between the familiar and strange,
or different horizons, when considered hermeneutically rather than psychologically,
constitutes a necessary tension “…between being a historically intended, distanciated
object and belonging to a tradition,” that functions as “…the true locus of
hermeneutics.”217 An explicit attempt to extricate this necessary tension is an integral
element of both a foundationalist epistemology and, arguably, a theoretical approach to
reason in their respective claims to maintain an element of sovereignty for the knower or
maker over his understanding.
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The Value of the Dialectic
In addition to characterizing the nature of understanding in terms of forestructures, legitimate prejudices, and a fusion of horizons, the metaphor of play is
extended to include the priority of the question, the nature of experience, and the problem
of application in conceptualizing the event that is understanding. For Gadamer, the
function of hermeneutics “…becomes of itself a questioning of things and is always in
part so defined,”218 where “…working out the hermeneutical situation means acquiring
the right horizon of inquiry for the questions evoked by the encounter with tradition.”219
Historically effected consciousness, which both determines and is determined by the
aforementioned fusion of horizons, is effectual in finding the right questions to ask.
These questions, which serve to open up possibilities and keep them open, result
from the productive condition afforded by the temporal distance between respective
horizons and maintain the tension of prejudice structures put at risk:
If a prejudice becomes questionable in view of what another person or a text says
to us, this does not mean that it is simply set aside and the text or the other person
accepted as valid in its place. In fact our own prejudice is properly brought into
play by being put at risk. Only by being given full play is it able to experience the
other’s claim to truth and make it possible for him to have full play himself.220
Because it is considered more of a disposition than an action to be able to determine what
is questionable, Gadamer contends that the idea of method, and consequently
teachability, thus remains limited for understanding. Conceived of instead as the art of
asking questions, the interpreter is able to remain open to further questioning and engages
in a valuable dialectic that constitutes real dialogue. Here, again, the concept of play is
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used to characterize the type of self-understanding inherent in assuming such a
hermeneutical perspective:
It cannot be denied that in an actual dialogue of this kind something of the
character of accident, favor and surprise - and in the end, of buoyancy, indeed, of
elevation - that belongs to the nature of the game is present. And surely the
elevation of the dialogue will not be experienced as a loss of self-possession, but
rather as an enrichment of our self, but without us thereby becoming aware of
ourselves.221
This type of questioning does not amount to either a technical quest for information, as in
the case of posing a loaded question or calling for a familiar answer, or a successful
means of persuasion, as in the case of the sophistic endeavor to argue another person
down, but rather motivates the development of subsequent questions, limited, of course,
by the horizon of the questioner.
The logical structure of the question is, in turn, implicit in the Gadamerian
conceptualization of experience, as discussed in Chapter Two. Similarly bounded by the
nature of horizon and caught up in the dialectic of interpretation, experience reaches its
fulfillment in remaining open to new experiences and not in its being qualified as a
confirmable event, as in the case of Aristotle’s techné. For the expert maker, experience
assumes a teleological function in that objective concepts or products assume the
distinction of being its proper outcome. On the other hand, for Gadamer, the idea of
experience is characterized by a Hegelian consideration of a “… new experience that
impresses itself on us precisely by interrupting or contradicting our previous experience
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and thereby enriching it.”222 This particular view denotes a sense of uncertainty,
irreversibility, and the limitedness of prediction, all constitutive elements in his concept
of play. As such, experience escapes any methodical attempts at control and
objectification and permits for the continual development of new pre-understandings.
Gadamer maintains a distinction between these understandings and those described by
both Descartes’ clear and distinct ideas and the Aristotelian notion of a sovereign maker
presiding over his poiesis: “Understanding is not, in fact, understanding better, either in
the case of superior knowledge of the subject because of clearer ideas or in the sense of
fundamental superiority of conscious over unconscious production. It is enough to say
that we understand in a different way, if we understand at all.”223
Because the historical horizon of experience is neither accidental nor subjective
but rather an ontological condition constitutively involved in understanding, the idea of
application cannot be construed of as distinct from the event of interpretation itself. In
fact, in the fundamental task of hermeneutics, to “…explicitly and consciously bridge the
temporal distance that separates the interpreter from the text and overcome the alienation
of meaning that the text has undergone,”224 resides the very act of its application. Unlike
the expert craftsman perfecting his techné, or the foundationalist employing his four-step
method, or the adherent of a pragmatic philosophy reducing all situations to problems to
be solved through technical or objective manipulation, the understanding interpreter does
not apply himself to any sort of detachment, cognitive or otherwise, but rather remains
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entangled in the mystery characteristic of self-understanding, as envisaged by Aristotle’s
phronesis and clarified by Gadamer:
The genuine reality of the hermeneutical process seems to me to encompass the
self-understanding of the interpreter as well as what is interpreted…The real event
of understanding goes beyond what we can bring to the understanding of the other
person's words through methodic effort and critical self-control...Through every
dialogue something different comes to be... It is not really we ourselves who
understand: it is always a past that allows us to say, “I have understood.”225

Similar to the irreducibility of experience to a predictable, controllable event, the notion
of application, when conceived of in terms of the ancient conception of moral selfknowledge, is subsumed in the very act of understanding which itself arises out of a
dialectic of question and answer between the tension-filled temporal distance between the
horizons of the interpreter and the object of interpretation, between the familiar and the
unfamiliar.
As presented in this chapter, Gadamer posits a view of understanding that differs
considerably from Descartes’ epistemology and technical forms of reasoning. Predicated
on the projection of non-arbitrary fore-structures, the possibility of legitimate prejudices,
and a historically-effected consciousness that results in an interplay between that which is
close at hand and that which is beyond, his philosophical hermeneutics undeniably rejects
any sort of methodical, routinized attempt to reduce instances of interpretation to
predictable, controllable events whose pre-determined telos, or end, prescribes all
necessary action. Insofar as an argument has been made in Chapter Four concerning the
considerable influence of this latter approach to understanding on the research and
discourse surrounding student understanding of NOS, incorporating Gadamer’s
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hermeneutics into that same discourse permits not only a consideration of the limitations
of such an approach but also allows for enlarging both the discourse itself and the nature
of student understanding. In the next chapter, then, I use the constitutive elements of
philosophical hermeneutics as explained here in the specific context of conceptualizing
student understanding of nature-of-science.

CHAPTER SIX
ENLARGING THE DISCOURSE

Introduction
In the preceding chapters, I contend that the predominant view on teaching for
developed student understandings of nature-of-science is largely predicated on particular
philosophical assumptions that favor a foundationalist epistemology while
simultaneously emphasizing the characteristic components of an Aristotelian form of
technical reasoning. Additionally, I maintain that, when considered from a hermeneutic
perspective, such assumptions may result in a foreclosed understanding, an understanding
that is reproducible through a series of controlled, methodical attempts that aim to reduce
it to a teleologically-based, readily assessable form of knowledge. I then offer
philosophical hermeneutics, as explicated by Hans-Georg Gadamer, as a viable referent
for reconceptualizing such understandings so that they may be more fully realized rather
than perfectly completed. In this chapter, I incorporate the constitutive elements of
Gadamer’s philosophy, both from his “rehabilitation of authority and tradition” as well as
his “recovery of the fundamental hermeneutic problem,” into the discourse surrounding
student understandings of NOS. In particular, I focus on such discourse as contained
within the major lines of inquiry in the science education literature as presented in
Chapter Three: namely, a multifarious rationale supporting NOS pedagogy, a
consideration of viable NOS tenets for pre-college students, learners’ preconceptions
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concerning NOS, the effectiveness of explicit approaches to teaching for the promotion
of NOS considerations, and the use of varied methods for assessing student
understandings. Before proceeding, I think it important to reiterate here both the nature
and purpose of engaging in a dialectic among arguably conflicting views related to the
conceptualization of the notion of understanding.
Preserving Gadamer’s intention to offer “…no new canon of interpretation or new
methodological proposals for reforming current hermeneutical practice,”226 I do not
recommend a new approach to teach for enhanced understanding of NOS concepts, nor
do I suggest a methodical, hermeneutic replacement for the currently accepted paradigm
within the NOS literature of conceptual change theory and other psychologically-derived
models of cognition. Instead, I strive to similarly “… retain the term hermeneutics not in
the sense of a methodology but as a theory of the real experience that thinking is.”227 In
that I began a philosophical examination of the nature of understanding because of a
seemingly limited view afforded to it by researchers and policy makers in the science
education communities, I aim to consciously avoid any attempt to present a view of
understanding, or teaching and learning for that matter, that can result in a technical form
of reasoning, devoid of new experiences and further questioning: “It is just that one
cannot start out with serious misgivings about the ascendancy of technical reason and
with a correlative desire to vindicate the integrity of practice and then, when one turns to
philosophy for confirmation of these misgivings and of this desire, to entertain an
implicitly technical notion of philosophy.”228 By engaging in hermeneutical inquiry thus
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conceived, I acknowledge the necessary tension between the philosophical assumptions
of the various participants engaged in the dialectic and endeavor to remain open to the
horizon of the other; an openness perhaps not entirely adhered to by Gallagher in his
hermeneutical questioning of the modernist view of education, as argued by Kerdeman
and explained in Chapter Two. The next section of this chapter advances the discourse of
student understanding of NOS considerations as Gadamer’s hermeneutics sought to do
for understanding in general.
Self- Understanding and Necessary Tension
As explained in Chapter Three, two of the rationales supporting the inclusion of
NOS considerations in the seminal science education reform documents and substantial
body of empirical research over the last two decades include seeking to ameliorate the
possible epistemic tensions encountered by learners when confronted with metaphysical,
epistemological, or other worldview perspectives that may differ from their own and
attempting to promote a greater sense of responsibility and develop enhanced decisionmaking skills among students. Insofar as the latter of these seems more characteristic of a
moral rather than technical development, a consideration of an Aristotelian practical
wisdom, or phronesis, permits for an alternative understanding of such development, as
distinct from that favored by a privileging of reason based on the analogy of an expert
maker, or techné. The widely-accepted assertion that “… at the foundations of many
illogical decisions and unreasonable positions are misunderstandings of the character of
science”229 both inaugurated and maintained a series of deliberate attempts on the part of
leaders in the science education community to include NOS considerations among the
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important learning outcomes of both national curricula and exemplary pedagogical
practices. These same researchers, while at times acknowledging the ability of students
designated as having fully formed or complete understandings to further evolve beyond a
prescribed model,230 subsequently adhere to a prescriptive account of knowledge that
varies from the idea of self-understanding. Rather than recognize the loss of self, as
explained by Gadamer in the metaphor of play and inherent in his account of
understanding in terms of phronesis, NOS advocates maintain a belief in the sought-after
sovereignty of the expert over his poiesis, or craft, as evidenced by their insistence on the
need “…to use scientific knowledge to make informed personal and societal
decisions,”231 denoting a sense of empowerment and freedom afforded to learners by a
mature understanding of NOS. Conceived of instead as a dialectical experience that
involves not so much “… a loss of self-possession, but rather [as] an enrichment of our
self, but without us thereby becoming aware of ourselves,”232 the idea of selfunderstanding offers researchers an alternative perspective through which to consider the
various rationales supporting NOS instruction, such as personal and societal
responsibility.
In addition to promoting enhanced decision-making skills and responsible
citizenry, several NOS proponents contend that a consideration of the development of
scientific knowledge and subsequent discussion contrasting such a development with
other ways of knowing eschew potential tensions that may arise between conflicting
worldviews. According to Gadamer, however, these tensions are in fact integral to the
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very act of understanding itself insofar as interpretation is comprised of an interplay
between the horizons of the interpreter and the object of interpretation, in this case, the
student and the nature-of-science, respectively. Referring again to the metaphor of play,
the student understands NOS only when his own prejudices are stirred up and put to risk
by being confronted with the various characteristics of the scientific enterprise and
scientific epistemology, in all of their forms. A deliberate attempt to avoid any element of
risk-taking, then, on the part of researchers and science educators alike espouses a view
of understanding in which “… for the sake of enjoying his own freedom of decision,
someone avoids making pressing decisions or plays with possibilities that he is not
seriously envisaging and which therefore offer no risk that he will choose them and
thereby limit himself.”233
Another line of inquiry that explicitly aims to dismiss the Gadamerian concept of
a necessary, tense-filled proximity between the familiar and the strange involves the
consideration of a consensus view of nature-of-science and resultant tenets purported to
be appropriate for secondary science students. In the case of the former, a denial or, at
best, a relegation of philosophical discord concerning the nature-of-science and its
characterization for students contrasts greatly with the hermeneutical endeavor to
question the dominant opinion by remaining open to the hermeneutical idea that unless
one understands differently, one does not understand at all. In the case of the latter, a set
of prescribed NOS tenets that serve to provide for the construction of standardized
definitions of fully formed NOS understandings promotes a view of understanding
conceptualized by the hermeneutic circle as envisaged prior to the work of Heidegger and
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Gadamer in the last century. For these researchers, student understandings are evaluated
in terms of their alignment with such pre-determined tenets. Gallagher explains this
alignment in terms of a desired coincidence between the understandings of the student
and those of the teacher or science education community. Whereas, for the majority of
NOS researchers, the concept of fully formed or complete understandings is evidenced by
a perfect alignment between these respective understandings, such a coincidence results
in a foreclosed understanding by attempting to move back and forth along the
hermeneutic circle until perfect understanding is achieved. When conceptualized in terms
of philosophical hermeneutics instead, “…the back and forth movement that takes place
within a given field of play does not derive from the human game and from playing as a
subjective attitude.”234 Understanding conceived in terms of a conservative hermeneutics
assumes a purely reproductive character that arguably leads to a form of education in
which “…the teacher remains very much in control of the discussion and students' input
is limited to answering questions that are posed by the teacher.”235 A Gadamerian view of
dialectic, alternatively, challenges the use of questions constructed so as to elicit
particular responses and, instead, encourages a dialogic conversation that results from
questions emanating from an interchange between the particular horizons of the known
and the unknown.
Appropriated Telos, Positive Prejudices, and Different Understandings
In addition to foreclosing the dialectic of understanding by intentionally avoiding
necessary tensions, a prescribed set of tenets, representative of a consensus view of NOS,
inevitably functions as viable, predetermined objectives to be applied in the development
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of explicit teaching practices aimed at enhancing student understandings of NOS. In such
instances, these objectives constitute the desirable end of the instructional process; a
process that can be conceptualized in terms of Aristotle’s teleological account of
knowledge, or techné: “This activity issues in a durable outcome, a product or state of
affairs which can be precisely specified by the maker before he engages in his activity
and which, as surviving the latter, provides it with its end or purpose (telos).”236 As
discussed earlier, techné provides “…a clear conception of the why and wherefore, the
how and with-what of the making process,”237 and consequently provides a foundation
for constructing explicit, controllable pedagogical methods over which a teacher can
preside with certain mastery. Dunne maintains that such a view of education considers
teaching as “…no longer embedded in particular contexts or within cultural, linguistic,
religious, or political traditions which may be at work in all kinds of tacit and nuanced
ways in teachers and pupils as persons.”238 In contrast, teaching for enhanced student
NOS understanding, considered in terms of philosophical hermeneutics, attempts to
refrain from assuming a similar teleological perspective. Instead, the end is conceived of
as constitutively caught up in the activity of teaching itself and does not admit of being
isolated from the horizon of the classroom, as in the case of praxis which “... required for
its regulation a kind of knowledge that was more personal and experiential, more supple
and less formulable, than the knowledge conferred by techné.”239
Just as in the event of teaching where “its secret is that there is an element in it of
“happening”- so that one can never preside over it, or experience sovereignty through it,
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as one can in the case of making,”240 NOS understandings conceptualized in terms of
Aristotle’s phronesis and Gadamer’s hermeneutics do not admit of an autonomous
knower capable of extricating himself from the authority of his tradition. Such a position
contrasts greatly with both Descartes and later members of the Romantic period and the
historical school who respectively endeavored either to eschew entirely or to relegate to
the designation of misunderstandings anticipatory prejudice structures so as to achieve
correct understandings. The influence of both a foundationalist epistemology and
conservative hermeneutics on research pertaining to student understanding of NOS is
evidenced by the plethora of empirical studies advocating for the proper diagnosis of
student prior knowledge so as to teach for conceptual change or enhanced views of the
development of scientific knowledge and the scientific enterprise. As discussed in
Chapter Three, these studies espoused a particular understanding of fore-structures and
oftentimes reduced their significance in favor of inducing a desirable conceptual shift.
For philosophical hermeneutics, these prejudice structures assume a positive rather than
negative value and, similar to the notion of temporal distance as explained earlier, are
actually integral in the act of understanding considered as a projection of such forestructures onto a foreign horizon. As such, student prejudices pertaining to NOS are not
inherently opposed to but rather constitute the necessary conditions for developing
different understandings. At the same time, these prejudices are not amenable to
methodical manipulation, as in the case of case of Descartes’ foundationalism, Romantic
hermeneutics, and conceptual change theory, and must remain open not so much to “what
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we do or what we ought to do, but [to] what happens to us over and above our wanting
and doing.”241
Insofar as fore-structures maintain their positive value, understanding is not
regarded as a forward-moving, progressive development as conceptualized in cognitive
models of learning. Rather than characterize understandings in terms of a transformation
from inadequate into adequate views or naïve towards more intermediary or informed
conceptions, Gadamer’s hermeneutics considers understanding as capable of being
enlarged into different understandings, not necessarily superior or better, than those
inherited from the horizon of tradition. Such a perspective is predicated on the
aforementioned Gadamerian notions of experience and questioning, both of which seek to
retain an open dialectic that does not admit of routine or foreclosure. In that this same
dialectic does not have “…its proper fulfillment in definitive knowledge,”242 efforts to
assess student understandings, through either quantitative or qualitative methods, and
subsequently characterize those understandings, either categorically or as being situated
along a developmental continuum, become questionable. Philosophical hermeneutics
additionally permits a reconsideration of these assessments in light of its insistence on an
inseparable relation between understanding and application, where “... application is
neither a subsequent nor merely an occasional part of understanding, but codetermines it
as a whole from the beginning.”243 This descriptive account of the event that is
understanding further affords NOS researchers the opportunity to enlarge the
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philosophical discourse pertaining to the act by which students make sense of the
multifarious descriptions of both scientific epistemology and the scientific enterprise.
As presented in the last three chapters, a consideration of philosophical
hermeneutics engages a dialectic with current assumptions on the nature of understanding
which underpin much of the research and policy pertaining to NOS pedagogy. Whether in
their attempt to propose criteria or tenets to function as cognitive learning objectives
capable of being assessed or their ongoing consideration of the effectiveness of various
pedagogical strategies aimed at promoting the development of desirable, informed
understandings, science educators remain indebted to the tradition of the foundationalist
primacy of method and a technical privileging of telos, both of which advance a notion of
understanding that is teachable. It is precisely because of its perceived teachability that
NOS understandings continue to maintain a prominent position in the larger discourse on
science education reform. As addressed in earlier chapters, however, an educational
philosophy predicated on such a view of understanding might result in a view of teaching
and learning reduced to a set of techniques which simply allows us to manage
information which in turn can result in a direct transmission of the same information that
amounts to a potential form of indoctrination. In that Aristotle’s phronesis concerns itself
with a self-understanding that does not admit of a specific, predetermined poiesis,
Gadamer’s hermeneutics permits an enlarged discourse that avoids both the foreclosure
of student understanding and the forestalling of the discourse itself.

CHAPTER SEVEN
SUSTAINED DIALECTIC
In the preceding chapters of this dissertation, I have attempted to make the case
for a reconceptualization of student understanding of nature-of-science concepts based on
philosophical hermeneutics. Firstly, I contend that current views on the teaching and
learning of NOS, as explained in Chapter Three, are predicated on a particular notion of
understanding, whose inherent assumptions were analyzed in Chapter Four, argued by
philosophers of education to contribute to pedagogical practices that may limit rather than
permit for the development of student understanding. Then, I suggest in Chapter Six that
a Gadamerian view of understanding, as described in Chapter Five, unlike the dominant
foundationalist, technical view arguably implicit in the majority of the NOS literature and
reform efforts, has the potential for enlarging student understandings of NOS as well the
broader educational discourse surrounding such understandings. In these concluding
pages, I wish to further support this last assertion regarding the value of Gadamer’s
hermeneutics in sustaining the dialectic between the multiple perspectives concerning
student understandings of NOS considerations.
As mentioned in Chapter Three, several of the primary reasons provided in
support of the inclusion of NOS pedagogy in both research and policy reform are
predicated on both acknowledging the epistemological worth, and even supremacy, of
scientific knowledge and maintaining a positive image and public opinion of the
scientific enterprise. The impetus for such proposals has been argued to have resulted
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largely in reaction to the influence of a variety of factors, some of which include the
publication of Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, subsequent
discourse by prominent sociologists of science, and work by learning theorists positing
constructivist accounts of knowledge - all of which have been interpreted, at least in part,
to present a relativistic view of NOS.244 While the question of whether or not Kuhn’s
seminal text did in fact provide the necessary background against which to launch a
postmodern rebuttal to the claims of science or researchers interested in explicating the
sociology of scientific knowledge collectively sought to undermine its development and
reduce its epistemological merit are worthwhile and interesting, they have been taken up
elsewhere and are not the subject of present concern.245 Likewise, the ongoing debate
regarding the impact of particularly radical constructivist learning theories, such as those
explicated by Ernst von Glasersfeld,246 on both the ontological and epistemological views
afforded to science in recent national reform documents has garnered extensive attention
from notable scholars and continues to be a point of discussion among concerned science
educators.247 The point I wish to make here does not involve an evaluation of the various
assertions put forth by philosophers, historians, sociologists, and science educators
concerning the value of the respective views on the nature-of-science but rather I suggest
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that, by situating the aporia arrived at through the interpretation of multiple perspectives
in Gadamer’s hermeneutics, scholars can sustain the discourse surrounding student
understandings without succumbing to the temptation to consider such understandings as
either perfectly foreclosed or subjectively relativistic interpretations of NOS.
As explained in Chapter One, Gallagher positions philosophical hermeneutics as a
moderate form of understanding situated between the more conservative claims of
Schleiermacher, Betti, and Hirsch, and the more radical views of Nietzche, Heidegger,
and Derrida:
Moderate hermeneutics proposes a somewhat optimistic view of interpretation.
Interpretation involves creativity and not just reproduction; the reader participates,
just as much as the author does, in putting together the meaning… This optimism
might be contrasted, on the one side, with the wishful thinking of the conservative
school and, on the other side, with what might appear to be the nihilism of radical
hermeneutics.248
He supports his contention by explaining the event that is understanding in terms of the
Gadamerian fusion of horizons resulting from the projecting of prejudice structures,
embedded in language, onto the horizon of the object of interpretation. Gallagher
maintains that language functions so as to limit our ability to gain absolute meaning, as in
the case of conservative hermeneutics, while still permitting some access to interpretation
in the form of a dialogical conversation, a conversation that does not then admit of a
purely subjective account of understanding. As such, the philosopher of education
suggests that subjective and objective interpretations represent the extremes of
understanding, both of which are inaccessible.
The case against a conservative rendering of understanding, as advanced in some
mode by literary scholars of the Romantic period, historians of the 18th and 19th centuries,
248
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and educational philosophers up to the present, has been a significant focus throughout
this thesis and, as such, has been addressed, in considerable detail, throughout the
preceding chapters of this paper. Rather than differentiate between the acts of
interpretation and meaning making, as did Schleiermacher, Dilthey and Hirsch, and strive
for complete understanding of a supposedly original intention, Gadamer, by uniting the
once disparate subilitas of understanding, interpretation, and application, proposed an
alternative description of the very experience of thinking itself. The value, of course, of
incorporating such a perspective into the discourse of NOS understandings is evidenced
by the inherent inability of its adherents to provide a complete or final account of
understanding, thereby forestalling the very nature of the dialogue. But the question may
remain, however, as to how to avoid relegating the various perspectives involved in the
conversation to merely subjective opinions or mental operations incapable of being
reconciled and therefore arbitrary and of no consequence. It is in response to this final,
particular aporia, then, that I appeal to Gadamer’s realism, as described by at least one
philosopher, in my attempt to offer some further explanation of the import of his
hermeneutics of understanding for both science educators and the larger educational
community as well.
In his editor’s introduction to Hermeneutics and Truth,249 philosopher Brice R.
Wachterhauser distinguishes between the various hermeneutical perspectives that resulted
from a turning away from a belief in dialectical completeness and absolute certainty.
While agreeing that such conceptions “… can no longer be considered as unproblematic
hallmarks of truth,” he contends that a number of prominent hermeneuts, such as Derrida,
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Nietzche, and Rorty, are guilty of committing a non sequitur in their assuming that, as a
consequence, “… the concept of truth itself has outlived its cognitive usefulness and
philosophic importance”250 as well.
Only by seeing our conversation as ultimately governed by the norm of truth do
our many attempts to make a point in a conversation become something more
than the utterance of a series of sounds which we hope will affect the behavior of
our interlocutor for our own advantage. Only the sincere search for truth
adequately distinguishes rational inquiry from mere sophistry.251
Rather than maintain a principled impossibility of any sort of real communication
between different viewpoints, each hermetically sealed off from the other, he argues that
Gadamer’s hermeneutics, by understanding these same differences as differences of
perspective, assumes a shared sense of reality beyond them, thereby precluding any
attempt at positing a relative account of knowledge. Instead, he characterizes Gadamer’s
theory of understanding as perspectival realism:
…because Gadamer insists again and again that the thing itself is always grasped
from a historically contingent, linguistically mediated perspective. This
lingustic/historical perspective functions as both a condition and a limit on our
understanding. The upshot of such a position is a view of human knowledge
which is inherently 'open', unable to come to final closure, or chart an
unambiguous line of progress but which does not despair of the possibility that
finite human beings can know reality itself.252
This knowing of reality can be traced to Heidegger’s earlier interpretation of truth
that takes place in the “…clearing of Being’s disclosure,” whereby particular aspects of
reality are uncovered in the act of understanding. Such understanding, however, is not to
be construed as either complete or exhaustive in that “…the conditions which make for
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disclosure also make for some inevitable obfuscation and covering over.”253
Wachterhauser develops a set of theses that seek to encapsulate this distinctive form of
realism which maintains that “…the whole thing or reality is present in the finite
linguistic view and yet no linguistic view exhausts the thing.”254 Insofar, then, as he
accepts the inherent contradictions that will arise from the inevitable incompatibility of
certain linguistic views, Gadamer understands such discord to be a positive, productive
impetus to a deeper truth: “Because I experience both the truth of each account, as well as
the contradictions between these accounts, I both need to interpret to eliminate the
contradictions and simultaneously have reason to think that the interpretation can in
principle, be successful.”255
The value of recognizing the “…the possibility of any interpretation that is
simultaneously linguistically-mediated, socially-constituted and reality based”256 is
hopefully obvious with regard to student understanding of NOS concepts as well as the
broader discipline of education. By taking understanding to be more than a simple reconstruction of some a priori pattern of meaning and an effort to reach some type of
agreement about something, philosophical hermeneutics advances the primacy of the
question in such a manner so as to suggest that “… one questions every question one
understands.”257 Preserving the Hegelian ideal of a whole truth while acknowledging that
the whole is never actually arrived at functions as an integral assumption for our efforts at
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interpretation that, as Wachterhauser maintains, is “neither naïve nor nihilistic” and does
not admit simply of “…an exchange of noises either in chorus or counterpoint designed
to produce a desired effect, but in no sense are they noises which contain truth.”258 The
constitutive elements of such a view of understanding, then, do not allow for a complete
interpretation of some specified object, nor do they diminish the concept of
understanding to subjective opinion or mere belief, but rather they provide the necessary
conditions for sustaining the dialectic and subsequently enlarging both student
conceptions of NOS and our own perspectives regarding the event that takes place in the
fusion of horizons between the familiar and the strange, involving both disclosure and
concealment, and remaining open to further experiences – the event that we call
understanding.
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